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PAKISTAN: A NATION AT WAR WITH ITSELF

by

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December 2010

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PAKISTAN: A NATION AT WAR WITH ITSELF

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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This thesis traces Pakistan's strategy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) against India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and analyzes the gains and losses to Pakistan arising from its implementation. LIC was primarily intended to wrest control of the state of J&K from India, to weaken India and its army, and to mobilize international support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir. While this strategy had some initial success, it slowly began to damage key political, economic and social structures within Pakistan. The thesis looks at both the gains and the pitfalls of LIC, and its impact on Pakistan's "well being," as measured by its prosperity, stability and international stature from the periods 1971 to 1989 and 1990 to 2009. The analysis shows that on balance, LIC is doing Pakistan more harm than any good. The thesis concludes by suggesting policy options open to Pakistan, the United States and India.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
IDP	Internal Displacement of People
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LOC	Line of Control
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

There is a general acceptance that when conventional military capability does not yield results, states resort to waging Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to achieve their desired end results.¹ Three times, Pakistan attempted to wrest control of Kashmir from India through military means and failed. It then renewed its experiments with LIC, as a way to achieve the goal of gaining control of Kashmir. Pakistan met with considerable success in the beginning, in terms of engaging a large part of the Indian Army, and was also able to keep the Kashmir issue alive in the international forum. It has only been over the last two decades that Pakistan began to feel the brunt of its LIC policies itself. Today Pakistan feels the impact in terms of sectarian conflicts, suicide bombings, Islamic radicalization, loss of civilian control, and a general sense of lawlessness in the state. This thesis will address the questions of how Pakistan's strategy of LIC in Jammu and Kashmir in India is impacting the general well-being of Pakistan, and if Pakistan has or lost gained from LIC in terms of its stability, economy, and international stature?

B. UNDERSTANDING LIC INITIATED BY PAKISTAN

Pakistan as a country generates intense debate and discussion, both among social scientists and security experts. The path that Pakistan takes in the next decade or two will have a direct impact on regional stability and, in turn, on world peace. Stephen Cohen argues that the "failure of Pakistan would be multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a world that craves for order and predictability."² Events in Pakistan also have a

¹ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15, (December 1992), 248.

² Stephen Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly*, (Summer, 2002), 118.

direct influence on the future course of events in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), now spearheaded by the United States with the help of many countries around the world.

Pakistan is considered by many to be the most dangerous foreign policy problem facing the United States, as it is an unstable, radicalized, and nuclear-capable country.³ Experts also consider Pakistan to be the world's most active sponsor of terrorism, with the possible exception of Iran.⁴ Pakistan represents an especially grave strategic threat to the international system because of its ambiguous approach to viewing and tackling terrorism, and because of its unique interpretation of who constitutes a "freedom fighter." A statement in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States suggests that it is at a greater risk from failing states than from conquering states, and this has brought a renewed focus on this alleged global menace.⁵ Experts have pointed out this danger. Ganguly and Kapur, for example, write that "many high-profile terrorist incidents ranging from the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington to the July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London to the November 2008 assault on Mumbai have had direct connections to individuals and groups operating in Pakistan."⁶ Riedel notes that

Pakistan almost uniquely is both a major victim of terrorism and a major sponsor of terrorism. It has been the scene of horrific acts of terrorist violence, including the murder of Benazir Bhutto in late 2007, and it has been one of the most prolific state sponsors of terror aimed at advancing its national security interests.⁷

³ Larry P Goodson, "Pakistan the Most Dangerous Place in the World," Strategic Studies Institute, (July 2009), 1.

⁴ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 155.

⁵ Aidan Hehir, "Is Pakistan a Failed State," Pakistan Security Research Unit, No. 15, (June 2007), 1.

⁶ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *The Washington Quarterly*, (January 2010), 47.

⁷ Bruce Riedel, "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm," *The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (July 2008), 31.

Under these circumstances, it becomes important to assess the LIC's impact on Pakistan. Is Pakistan gaining from this policy of LIC, or is it losing? If indeed Pakistan is gaining from this policy, then it has the potential to set a dangerous precedent for future state actors with a similar intent. The strategy of a smaller, aggrieved state beginning an LIC against a larger state can become the norm, and this has the potential to upset the fine balance of power that exists in the present world order. On the other hand, if the strategy of supporting an LIC is doing more harm than good, then it is incumbent on the host nation and the international community to recognize this and act upon it in order to initiate corrective measures. In either case, an answer to this question is vital for Pakistan in particular and to the whole world in general, as it has direct implications on peace and stability in Pakistan and the rest of the world.

Relations between Pakistan and India have remained strained since independence on various issues, with the most contentious of these being Kashmir. They have fought three full-scale wars – in 1947 and 1965 over Kashmir, and in 1971 on both fronts, which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh, and, finally, a localized war in 1999 in the Kargil Sector. Pakistan was beaten back each time, and has since looked at alternate options that will permit it to stop this one-sided war and have winning options. "Pakistan has always faced a strategic dilemma: it is a big enough state to play the game, but not big enough to win. Pakistan repeatedly underestimated the capability of the Indian Armed Forces and the possible responses of the government of India to military challenges. To overcome this handicap, Pakistan played a masterstroke by initiating an effective, well coordinated, and volatile low intensity operations against India in Jammu and Kashmir."⁸ Commenting on the assessment of India by Pakistan, Ganguly argues:

[t]he anti-Indian and chauvinistic ideology of the authoritarian Pakistani state repeatedly contributed to a flawed assessment of India's military capabilities and will. Such chauvinist propaganda

⁸ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," 239.

was able to thrive within Pakistani state because of the arrested development of democratic institutions and prolonged periods of authoritarian military rule.⁹

Pakistan saw fomenting trouble in Jammu and Kashmir and other North Eastern states of India as a “low-cost, high-gain option.” In effect, sponsoring insurgency in India was seen as a means of balancing the asymmetries (through the philosophy of a war by thousand cuts) between the two countries.¹⁰ President Asif Ali Zardari, in a meeting with retired senior officials, is said to have admitted that the terrorist outfits were “deliberately created and nurtured as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives.”¹¹ Former Pakistani President General Musharraf, in a recent interview with German magazine *Der Spiegel*, made the candid confession that the “Pakistan government trained terrorists against India and pushed them into Jammu and Kashmir.”¹² In the past decade, Pakistan has slowly moved from complete deniability of its hand in sponsoring terrorism in India to partial acceptance of its culpability albeit under pressure from United States of America. So there is a general acceptance that state-sponsored terrorism is being attempted by Pakistan across national boundaries in India.¹³ As a recent Rand Corporation report argued, “the Use of militant groups, including the Taliban, has remained an important instrument for Pakistan’s security forces in its regional strategy.”¹⁴

⁹ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) 7.

¹⁰ Peter Chalk, “Pakistan’s Role in Kashmir Insurgency,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, (September 2001), 1.

¹¹ *Policy Research Group*, July 2009, <http://policyresearchgroup.com/pakistan/330.html> (accessed May 15, 2010).

¹² Indrani Bagchi, *Pak Trained Terrorists to fight India: Musharraf*, October 6, 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pak-trained-terrorists-to-fight-India-MUSharraf/articleshow/6694651.cms> (accessed October 12, 2010).

¹³ Raju G.C. Thomas, “India’s Security Environment, towards the year 2000,” Strategic Studies Institute, (July 1996), 9.

¹⁴ Chistine Fair, *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State*, Monograph (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), xiv.

Pakistan was also involved in aiding, with the help of the CIA, the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan during the Russian occupation of that country in the 1980s. It continued to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan even after the Soviets left the country in 1989. Post "9/11," when the United States entered Afghanistan, Pakistan by virtue of its geographic position and certain choices made by its leaders became a frontline state in the GWOT. Pakistan began fighting the Taliban, albeit reluctantly as they needed the United States' support and economic aid. This change in its stand created immense unease and distrust between the government and the Muslim clergy (who controlled the insurgent and terrorist groups). The launching of an LIC in India and the support of the United States in its GWOT were defining moments for Pakistan, as these led to the beginning of Jihad within Pakistan and to a spiraling state of instability.

Pakistan had never been at the center of focus before, as its actions in South Asia impacted regionally and Western experts largely ignored it and its actions. The tragic events of 9/11 and Pakistan's involvement in the GWOT in "partnership with United States, have brought it diplomatic support, political protection, international legitimacy and immense sums of aid."¹⁵ "Today Pakistan is clearly both part of the problem, and the solution to the threat of terrorism facing the United States."¹⁶ Along with this came intense scrutiny of Pakistan's actions on the ground by security experts around the world, who were keen to know whether Pakistan supported the GWOT or was against it. The last decade has seen more scholarly articles on the situation in Pakistan, and its impact on regional and global stability, than in the previous two decades. A detailed study of LIC initiated by Pakistan is important, as it provides an understanding of the impact of LIC on a weaker state when it attempts to take on a stronger

¹⁵ Robert M. Hathaway, "Leverage and Largesse: Pakistan's post-9/11 Partnership with America," *Contemporary South Asia*, (March 2008), 11.

¹⁶ Ashley J. Tellis, "U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2004), 97.

adversary, Using LIC as a state strategy. Findings from this research can give a broad idea of what kind of results the future perpetrators of LIC are likely to have under similar circumstances.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

My thesis's hypothesis is that one of the main causes for the breakdown of political, economic, and social structures in Pakistan in the last two decades is a consequence of Pakistan's policy of directing LIC, i.e., aiding, abetting, and sponsoring terror and insurgency in its neighboring countries as a conscious strategy. Some of Pakistan's important goals in adopting the strategy of LIC have been:

- To weaken India.¹⁷
- To tie down the Indian Army so that it does not pose a significant conventional threat and also be able to use the Jihadists to further their aims in case Pakistan launches a conventional offensive into Kashmir.¹⁸
- To put international pressure on India to come to the negotiation table, on terms favorable to Pakistan, with the ultimate aim of wresting the state of Kashmir from India's control¹⁹

Pakistan-backed radical groups have undermined the governance in Kashmir and tied down thousands of Indian Army troops.²⁰ While this apparently supports the rationale that aiding and abetting terrorism is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities, it has also led to the "creation of multiple centers of power in Pakistan, meaning that the state has abdicated a

¹⁷ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 298.

¹⁸ Ibid., 174.

¹⁹ Ibid.,

²⁰ Ibid., 156.

large portion of its ‘monopoly on violence,’ in the Weberian sense.”²¹ According to Gill, “[a]midst multiple insurgencies, there is current uncertainty over what constitutes state leadership in Pakistan. President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, the Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the ISI, and the military establishment, are all competing for power, with each of these players further complicating the situation in the pursuit of divergent personal and partisan agendas.”²² Within the complex web of issues confronting Pakistan, there is a need to understand how the desire of Pakistan to wrest Kashmir from India, and to provide itself strategic depth in Afghanistan, is impacting its domestic and international policies.

Gregory believes that “Pakistan has been termed a persistently failing state, that is, a state which exhibits many of the features of a ‘failed state,’ but somehow manages not to collapse and disintegrate.”²³ Pakistan, in spite of its large-scale involvement in sponsoring terrorism, is “off the hook” because of its support to the United States in Afghanistan. Accordingly, Pakistan is regarded as an ally by the United States, receiving both massive funding and little international criticism.²⁴ This U.S.–Pakistan relationship has slightly skewed the relationship between state sponsorship of insurgency and its possible effects on the host country.

The radicalization of Pakistan, which began over three decades ago, has now reached a stage where it has become self-sustaining and there is a “spontaneous groundswell of Islamic zeal.”²⁵ By supporting the cause of

²¹ Khaled Ahmed, *Heinrich Boll Stiftung*, March 8, 2010, <http://www.boell-pakistan.org/web/116-548.html> (accessed on May 13, 2010).

²² K.P.S. Gill, *Pakistan Assessment 2009*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan> (accessed May 13, 2010).

²³ Shaun Gregory and Christine Fair, “The Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan,” *Pakistan Security Research Unit*, (April 2008), 3.

²⁴ Barry Rubin, “The Rubin Report,” <http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2009/12/terrorism-and-state-sponsorship-n0t.html> (accessed February 21, 2010).

²⁵ Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan - the Threat from Within,” *Pakistan Security Research Unit*, No.13 (May 2007), 3.

jihadists, Stephen Cohen believes, Pakistan has weakened its own stability, as many Islamists do not separate domestic politics from their actions in Afghanistan and Kashmir.²⁶ The prized policies of “Jihad” and “Proxy Warfare” have become the bane of Pakistan, as its own citizens and the Army has begun to bear the brunt of attacks by religious militant groups. The strategy of initiating LIC has made Pakistan internally unstable and has grossly reduced its foreign policy options for getting closer to Kashmir. The events of 9/11 and Pakistan’s subsequent support for the United States’ GWOT has further upset its strategy and grossly reduced its options to fight a successful LIC against India. Today, Pakistan is under intense pressure to rein in the militants within its own borders, and also to stop all kinds of support to militant groups operating out of its soil in both India and Afghanistan.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

To analyze the effect of LIC on Pakistan, it is first necessary to trace their prevalence over a period of time, and then to study its growth patterns along with its main causes, and its effects on Pakistan. For the purpose of comparative study, the period of Pakistan’s involvement in LIC will be divided into two parts. The first part covers the period from 1971 to 1989, when LIC was not prevalent in Kashmir, and the second part, from 1990 to 2009, covers the period when Pakistan unleashed the full force of LIC against India, exploiting the opportunity provided by India in Kashmir. The year of 1989 was a defining moment, when Pakistan shifted the entire might of the Jihadists from Afghanistan in the West to Kashmir in the East, in order to prosecute LIC. Commenting on Pakistan’s footprint in Kashmir, Kapur states:

[a]lthough the Kashmir issue had appeared to subside during the 1970s and the early 1980s, by 1989 it was once again a major source of tension, with the Pakistan backed insurgency wracking

²⁶ Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), 34.

Indian Kashmir, and India flooding the territory with hundreds of thousands of security forces in an attempt to crush the uprising.²⁷

To analyze the effect of LIC, it is necessary to see its impact on the “well-being” of Pakistan, in the two periods of time discussed above, i.e., from 1971-1989, when LIC were not present, and 1990 to 2009, when the policy of LIC was in full force. An evaluation of any country’s well-being would take into account its prosperity, stability, and international stature. Prosperity would encompass the study of a nation’s GDP, level of poverty, human development index, the state of education, and opportunities for intellectual freedom. Stability would involve the study of the nature of government, regime changes, effective law and order, and judicial independence. International stature may be gauged by access to international organizations, and the confidence of multinational and national companies from the point of view of investments. An appraisal of the above-mentioned components of governance will provide us with a rough assessment of the well-being of Pakistan.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

In Chapter I, the research question and its importance are discussed, as are the hypothesis and methodology of this work.

Chapter II explains the issues of state sponsorship of insurgency/terrorism, LIC, and Islamic radicalization; it will then attempt to establish a link among the three. State sponsorship of insurgency/terrorism, while not a new phenomenon, was reinvented by Pakistan in order to meet its strategic needs.

Chapter III will outline the genesis of the problem in South Asia. It will include the traumatic division of India and Pakistan’s evolution as a state. It will cover the India–Pakistan Wars in some detail, and will then attempt to analyze how these events led Pakistan to discover the power of LIC as a low cost–high

²⁷ Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), 3.

gain option. The chapter will also address other important domestic and regional events such as the Punjab militancy, the Jammu and Kashmir militancy, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the events in South Asia post- 9/11, which had an impact on Pakistan and its involvement in LIC in both Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Chapter IV will look in detail at both the advantages and the pitfalls of Pakistan's strategy of LIC and their effect on the well-being of the state, as measured by its prosperity, stability, and international stature. A comparative analysis of the period from 1971 to 1989, and then from 1990 to 2009, will be carried out in depth to see how some measures of well-being changed during this period.

Chapter V will identify policy implications for the key actors in the region, i.e., Pakistani political leaders, Pakistan's military, the United States, and India, with respect to Pakistan's using LIC as conscious state strategy.

II. UNDERSTANDING LIC, STATE SPONSORSHIP OF INSURGENCY AND ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN PAKISTAN'S CONTEXT

A. INTRODUCTION

The desire of Pakistan to wage LIC stems from the issue of its non-acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir. Pakistan genuinely believed that India had set in motion a process to completely amalgamate Kashmir into India and end its special status.²⁸ Pakistan accordingly made three failed attempts—in 1947, 1965, and 1971—to alter the situation by launching conventional operations. Because Pakistan lacked the military capability to achieve its desired end state, it slowly tilted towards using LIC as a possible alternative. Ganguly and Kapur further clarify:

[t]hroughout its history, Pakistan has deliberately used non-state actors as a strategy of asymmetric warfare against stronger adversaries such as India and the Soviet Union. Islamist militants were armed and trained by elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and funded by a sophisticated international financial network. This enabled Pakistan to attrite Indian and Soviet resources via proxy, without having to face either country in a direct conflict.²⁹

LIC is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in one form or another since the establishment of organized states.³⁰ V.K. Sood explains that “LIC as a combination of racial, tribal, religious and regional struggles, [...] which is

²⁸ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*, 159.

²⁹ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," 49.

³⁰ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," 235.

manifested primarily in insurgency, subversion, and terrorism.³¹ Shultz describes it as “a confrontation short of full scale war.”³²

Any state, which intends to wage LIC in a neighboring country, needs to meet certain preconditions. The most important of these is the political will of the host nation to prosecute LIC against the other. The second is the existence of a suitable situation in the target state that is amenable to exploitation. The link between these two preconditions is the availability of a motivated population that is ready to take the fight across borders. The key question is, “how do you motivate your population to take the battle across the borders?” In the context of Pakistan, it was Islam and the Islamic radicalization that came to their aid.

Pakistan was able to leverage the Islamic identity of the nation in order to mobilize radical elements within Islam to take up the cause of jihad in Kashmir in the 1990s. Pakistan had already tasted the efficacy of jihad, which it had carried out in the 1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan, with the active support of the United States. It was confident of its ability to replicate the same success in Kashmir, as India presented a ripe opportunity in terms of a disturbed internal situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s. Two other factors that further facilitated an effective LIC by Pakistan were the geographic co-location of India and the difficult mountainous terrain of Kashmir. During the 1990s, Pakistan mobilized all it had in terms of statecraft, Islamic radicals, mujahideen, sectarian outfits, excess weapons of Afghan war, and sufficient funds to wage an LIC against India in Kashmir, with the aim of undermining India’s control over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. To comprehend Pakistan’s position on the issue of its overt and covert support to Kashmiri separatists, it is important to first understand the meaning of terms such as insurgency, state sponsorship of insurgency, and LIC.

³¹ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability, 234.

³² Richard H Shultz, "The Low Intensity Conflict Environment of the 1990s," *Annals of American Academy of Political Science*, 1991, 120.

B. INSURGENCY, STATE SPONSORSHIP OF INSURGENCY, AND LIC

1. Insurgency

To understand LIC and state sponsorship of insurgency, it is necessary to first understand, what is insurgency? Insurgency, simply stated, is an armed rebellion against a duly constituted government. Insurgents engage in a range of activities including guerrilla warfare, political mobilization, and even acts of terrorism. In the classic sense, “terrorism in this context is a specific tactic that insurgents use, as part of a broader strategy to control a particular geographic area. So, terrorism is an auxiliary mode of violence rather than an exclusive one.”³³ Organizations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, Hezbollah of Lebanon, or the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in India, typically come under the category of insurgencies. The progress of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations can cause some of these organizations to lean more towards being terrorist organizations, especially when they lose sight of some of the basic aims of carrying out an insurgency.

2. State Sponsorship of Insurgency

State sponsorship of insurgency as an instrument of state policy is not a new phenomenon, and the same was widely used as a foreign policy tool during the Cold War.³⁴ “Superpowers like the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union regularly backed their favored proxies, often transforming local quarrels into international contests. The end of Cold War saw a change in the nature and scope of state sponsorship of insurgency. The scene of activity shifted from the big players to smaller states like Iran, Angola, Uganda and Pakistan, which were to devote far less amounts of money and resources to their proxies.”³⁵ State

³³ Daniel Byman et. al., *Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 5.

³⁴ Ibid., xiii.

³⁵ Ibid.

sponsorship of insurgency, unlike other types of support, has the ability to sustain a movement for a much longer period and has greater power of deniability if the support they lend is well calibrated.

3. Implications of State Support to Insurgencies

A state retains the capacity to provide various types of aid, including manpower, material, and money, to insurgents. The state also retains the capability to provide fighters with a place to train and organize, in addition to providing diplomatic support and representation in international forums.³⁶ At the other end of the spectrum, states could merely be providing moral support, which in modern times is sufficient enough for many insurgencies to thrive. According to Byman, “of the 74 insurgencies active since 1991 that were surveyed for a report, 44 received state support and that, in our judgment, was significant or critical to the survival and success of those movements.”³⁷ This clearly highlights the power and efficacy of state sponsorship of insurgency or terrorism and its ability to provide the required momentum to these organizations.

An insurgency can benefit immensely from both state and non-state supporters, as it has the ability to prolong war, increase the scale and lethality of its struggle, and may even transform a civil conflict into an international war.

4. State Sponsorship of Insurgency as a Strategy

Before the end of the Cold War, it was the superpowers that were most intimately involved in aiding and abetting insurgencies around the world. In the absence of this rivalry, support for insurgencies is now most often provided by local governments, which border the country in which the insurgents are fighting. Geographic co-location provides a large number of advantages to the sponsoring state in terms of logistics, costs, and perception management. In the case of Pakistan, it was the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, which was the

³⁶ Daniel Byman et al., Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments, xiv.

³⁷ Ibid., 9.

lead agency, that shaped the character of the LIC in Kashmir and the rest of India. "Pakistan, one of the most generous sponsors of insurgent groups in the 1990s, provided tens of millions of dollars to its favored movements."³⁸ Pakistan supported a large number of insurgent groups in Kashmir and Bangladesh, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan, in order to checkmate the advantages that its neighbor India had in terms of its size, power, and economy. Thus, "insurgencies essentially are wars by other means. Support to rebel movements is therefore seen as an alternative and a less direct means of weakening and undermining enemies or rivals."³⁹ Pakistan's desire to annex Kashmir from India led it to adopt LIC as a conscious strategy. LIC, as a means of warfare, becomes particularly attractive when other types of engagement become either costly or impractical. Another important advantage of LIC is the ability of a nation to wage this kind of warfare over prolonged periods of time, with little or no cost to itself, but imposing substantial costs on the opposing party.

5. Why Support Insurgencies

a. *Prestige*

Support of insurgencies can lend an air of prestige to both weak and strong regimes; this is especially true when the country is going through a period of domestic turmoil. "This motivation is particularly important if the leader or the regime has ambitions outside its immediate neighborhood. Many Arab states provided support to the PLO to strengthen their Arab nationalist credentials."⁴⁰ Pakistan's support of the Muslim Kashmiri nationalists can be seen from the point of view of its desire to be a leader in the Muslim Ummah, or "Community of the Believers" (ummah al-mu'minin). According to Byman, "[o]ne benefit Pakistan gains from fomenting unrest in Afghanistan and Kashmir is the

³⁸ Daniel Byman et al., Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments, 17.

³⁹ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 36.

prestige derived from championing Islam, a benefit of growing importance for Islamabad given the importance of *political Islam* in Pakistan today.”⁴¹

b. Ensuring Influence within the Opposition

Many states support insurgencies or dissident movements in neighboring countries only to checkmate opposition parties, “who otherwise could adopt goals or policies that are hostile to its interests.”⁴² States can also attempt to change the ultimate goal of an insurgency by manipulating the kind and intensity of aid to different insurgent groups operating in the target country. Pakistan, which initially helped the indigenous insurgent group the JKLF, slowly weaned away its support, as its overall agenda differed from that of the JKLF. “Islamabad prefers to aid those insurgents whose agendas squared more directly with its own goals.”⁴³

c. Internal Security

Another interesting aspect of state sponsors “is the use of insurgents against their own dissidents or other antigovernment groups.”⁴⁴ Pakistan has often used this tool to settle political scores with opposition parties. Both Generals Zia and Musharraf employed it to keep political opponents in check when other methods failed. Pakistan has also used this strategy in Afghanistan, to prop up groups in Taliban, which were in conformity with its own ideologies.

d. Irredentism

Overt irredentism, while rare, can still be a great source of motivation for states to support insurgencies.⁴⁵ Byman observes, “homogeneous

⁴¹ Daniel Byman et al., Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments, 36.

⁴² Ibid., 34.

⁴³ Ibid., 35.

⁴⁴ Ibid.,

⁴⁵ Ibid., 38.

states, unlike governments with heterogeneous composition, are more likely to support the cause for insurgencies, with the aim of acquiring territory that is home to the same ethnic group.”⁴⁶ Pakistan has accordingly supported the Islamic insurgencies in Kashmir, to take control of that part of Kashmir that is held by India. Irredentism also takes advantage of a lack of central authority in an existing state which is home to large numbers of religions or ethnicities. Pakistan was in a position to intervene seriously in Kashmir in the late 1980s only because of the lack of effective governance in the region. Every country involved in providing aid to insurgencies has its own unique reasons and compulsions. It is usually a combination of reasons, which compels states to go ahead and take the risk of abetting insurgency.

Pakistan’s involvement in supporting insurgency in Kashmir can be traced back to a combination of historical reasons, domestic political and security compulsions, and a desire to be a leader in the Muslim world.

C. ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION

Pakistan became an independent nation on 14 August 1947. Even today, however, it continues to struggle with tensions arising from its attempts to identify itself both as a Muslim state and also as a modern nation-state.⁴⁷ This two-nation theory is the basis of Pakistan’s foundation. Islam and Islamic values are embedded in some form in the two-nation theory. While Pakistan came into being as an Islamic country, Islam was never the basis for its foundation. However, post-independence there were rapid changes in Pakistan’s political and religious ideologies. The country slowly transited from secular ideology to one of Islamic theocracy. This began with the adoption of the “objectives resolution” passed by the constituent assembly in March 1949, which was followed by the interim report of the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) in September 1950.⁴⁸ While not being

⁴⁶ Daniel Byman et al., Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments, 38.

⁴⁷ Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” 109.

⁴⁸ Daniel Byman et al., Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments, 38

anti-secular, these resolutions heralded Islamic ideology and religious rhetoric, which were to become the centerpiece of Pakistani politics in the next half-century. A study of the role of Islam in Pakistani politics is important, as Pakistan has consistently used it as one of the tools for waging LIC.

After Pakistan's defeat in the war of 1971, the leadership of the country fell to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, whose party had won the 1970 elections. Bhutto created a unique combination of Islam and socialism, which was designed to give legitimacy to his government. The Constitution of 1973 retained the name of the country as 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan' and more importantly declared the state religion of Pakistan as "Islam."⁴⁹ In 1977, General Zia Ul Haq deposed Bhutto in a military coup on the grounds of saving the country from degeneration and instability. Islamist organizations that had never supported military regimes before were used by General Zia through a policy of Islamization and promoting Jamaat members and their allies to ministerial positions.⁵⁰

General Zia, unlike Bhutto, was regarded as a pious Muslim, which helped him to gain the confidence of the Islamists. Zia's interpretation of Islam was basically drawn from the Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami's view of religion. The model for the Islamization project was supplied by Maulana Maududi's theory of the state, and the Jamaat-i-Islami was the only political party that could freely function during General Zia's regime. During his rule many aspects of the judiciary, education, and the media were subjected to far-reaching changes. Maududi did not allow any place for modern Western or liberal thought and relied entirely on the Quran and Sunnah.⁵¹ During this period Pakistan recorded its greatest increase in religious parties, sectarian organizations, and jihad-related organizations. The country also recorded its highest-ever growth rate in religious schools, as the number of Madrassahs increased from 700 in 1982 to

⁴⁹ Jennifer Bennett, *Pakistan: Reality, Denial and the Complexity of its State* (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2009), 48.

⁵⁰ Matthew P Tylor, *Pakistan's Kashmir policy and Strategy since 1947*, NPS Thesis, 61.

⁵¹ Jennifer Bennett, *Pakistan: Reality, Denial and the Complexity of its State*, 51.

approximately 7,000 by 2002.⁵² Currently, it is estimated that there are between 18,020 to 20,000 Madrassahs operating in Pakistan, teaching over 1.5 million children. Explaining the use of religion in Pakistan, Bennett argues that

[a]highly destructive and long-lasting effect of the use of religion for political purposes, during Zia's reign, was Pakistan's involvement as a frontline state in the Afghan Jihad, and the creation of the mujahedin to drive out the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Islam was no longer an instrument of power for the local ruling classes, for it now became a tool in the global imperial contests over West and Central Asian oil and gas resources.⁵³

A decade of civilian rule after the death of Zia did not fundamentally alter the role and importance of religious parties. In spite of Benazir Bhutto being secular and liberal, she went along with these parties to remain in power. Nawaz Sharif became prime minister with the help of the conservative Islami Jamhoori Ittehad in 1990. During his tenure, the Sharia Act of 1991 was passed. This was also the time when Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan and Pakistan became deeply involved in its affairs. "An examination of the post-partition history of Pakistan reveals that virtually every ruler, whether civil or military, religious or 'enlightened moderate,' used religion as an instrument of the attainment, maintenance and perpetuation of power."⁵⁴ In the recent past, new radical Islamic parties have emerged, which are more violent and less agreeable to political solutions for their perceived problems. Pakistan represents an especially grave strategic threat to the international system because of its ambiguous approach to viewing and tackling terrorism, and for its unique interpretation of who constitutes a "freedom fighter."

⁵² Robert Looney, "Reforming Pakistan's Educational System: The Challenge of the Madrassas," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Fall 2003: 260.

⁵³ Jennifer Bennett, *Pakistan: Reality, Denial and the Complexity of its State*, 55.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 45.

1. Radical Jihadi Groups of Pakistan

Pakistan has been home to a large number of radical jihadi groups, which are operating with bases both within Pakistan, and outside its territory. Many of these groups are often in a state of transition with events like splits, mergers, changes in names, or changes in affiliation being quite common. According to Tellis and as quoted by Bajoria, the terrorist groups in Pakistan can broadly be divided as:

Sectarian - Groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan.

Anti-Indian - Terrorist groups that operate with the alleged support of the Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM).

Afghan Taliban - The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar believed to be now living in Quetta.

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates - The organization led by Osama bin Laden and other non-South Asian terrorists believed to be ensconced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Rohan Gunaratna of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore says other foreign militant groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad group, the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement are also located in FATA.

The Pakistani Taliban - Groups consisting of extremist outfits in the FATA, led by individuals such as Hakimullah Mehsud, of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur, and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).⁵⁵

A significant development in the last decade has been the development of a synergy amongst these terrorist groups.⁵⁶ The Pakistani Taliban, which was committed to fighting the state, is now increasingly targeting U.S. and international troops fighting on the borders of Afghanistan.⁵⁷ The complexity of

⁵⁵ Jayshree Bajoria, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2010: 2.

⁵⁶ Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2004: 491.

⁵⁷ Jayshree Bajoria, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists," 2.

these organizations was described by General David H. Petraeus in a CFR interview as “They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other and sometimes they even fight with each other, making it extremely difficult to distinguish between them.”⁵⁸ Without a coherent target it is extremely difficult for Pakistan and the international community to isolate and target any particular group. The complexity of the problem has often numbed Pakistan, and to a great extent even the international community.

2. Islam, Islamization, and its Radicalization in Pakistan

The beginnings of Islam in Pakistan were well founded, as the initial objective was to create a Muslim-majority state in South Asia as a homeland for India’s Muslims.⁵⁹ “Islam was mobilized, to bridge the differences between “Sons of soil” and Muhajirs [Muslim migrants from India to Pakistan], and also between the provinces and the country’s leadership. Islam thus became the main legitimating force in Pakistan’s politics, underlying the viability of the federal state.”⁶⁰ With the passage of time, Pakistan paid less and less attention to how it would transform itself into a Muslim state. In terms of this transformation, Pakistan can still be considered as a state in transition, as it continues to debate the role of Islam and Koran in the affairs of the state.

While its founding father, Jinnah, wanted the state to be secular, Pakistan today is slowly sliding towards becoming a pure Islamic state. As Pakistan evolved, Islam was mobilized whenever the state was challenged by either war or internal conflict. The military and civilian governments in power never allowed a free rein to the Islamists. Some of the secularization policies, in contravention to religious sentiments, while weakening the Islamic basis of the state, opened

⁵⁸ Jayshree Bajoria, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists," 2.

⁵⁹ Stephen P. Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," 8.

⁶⁰ Vali Nasr, "The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 182.

up avenues for ethnic politics, which ultimately culminated in the secession of East Pakistan.⁶¹ The separation of Bangladesh further acted as a catalyst for Islamization in Pakistani politics. Nasr points out:

Islamic identity, promoted by the state to contain separatist tendencies, now drew on the more stringent ideology of Islamism to define Pakistani identity. Pakistan moved from being a homeland for Muslims to being the embodiment-and also guarantor-of the Islamic ideal as defined by the ideology of Islamism.⁶²

This process of slow Islamization saw the gradual transfer of some aspects of power from the democratically-elected governments to non-state actors, who were to dictate the pace of implementation of Sharia and such other rules and regulations dealing with religion. This abdication by the state of its right to govern and rule led to the beginning of lawlessness in the nation.

D. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT BY PAKISTAN

An LIC can be fought in two generally accepted methods: The indirect, or standoff, method was practiced primarily by the superpowers, where they only provided resources or military hardware for the fight; or the direct method, where the host country provides both military hardware and the trained manpower to carry out an LIC. Pakistan finds it both convenient and effective to wage the direct method of LIC against India.

This method typically involves an LIC waged by the host nation against a near neighbor. It entails the identification of an insurgency-like situation that is amenable for exploitation, followed by a supply of resources and trained manpower. This also requires that the host nation invest its time and resources in the establishment of training camps, safe heavens, launch pads, retrieving stations, communication grids, and rehabilitation camps that will run during the entire cycle of LIC (see Figure 1). The most important and critical component of

⁶¹ Vali Nasr, "The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry," 183.

⁶² Nasr, "The India Pakistan Conflict" 183.

this cycle is the recruitment, indoctrination, and training of manpower. In the context of Pakistan, manpower is provided by Islamic radicals who are churned out from the many radicalized madrassahs.

Pakistan also facilitates the crossing of radicalized elements from Kashmir to Pakistan, with the aim of providing them training and further indoctrination to assume leadership roles back in insurgency-hit Kashmir. All these cross-border transactions require the active support of the Pakistani Army, as the Line of Control (LOC) is manned by them. From the above it is clear that in order to orchestrate an LIC the entire state machinery needs to become galvanized into action, albeit without public or judicial scrutiny. The complexity of waging LIC lies in the ability or inability of the state to control and fine-tune this process, without legal sanction. This ad hoc system has the potential to blow back against the host nation when there are disgruntled militants who either have their own agendas, or who wish to prosecute the LIC at a different place or in a different manner. The local law and order machinery is often confused about the status of these men who operate on both sides of the border with impunity. This amorphous status is often exploited by militants in order to pursue their own policies. Ganguly and Kapur note, "Pakistan's use of militants has increasingly spun out of control, creating serious internal and external security challenges."⁶³

The explanation above attempts to establish a causal link between prevalence of an insurgency-like situation in the neighborhood, the exploitation of the situation by neighboring nation in order to wage LIC, and the availability of Islamic radical elements willing to fight a proxy war, which results in the creation of a powerful jihadi movement. Each of these individual elements has a symbiotic relationship with the other, and hence for the LIC to persist, each of the components must thrive. The unique aspect of this cycle is that the jihadist activities in the host nation are far greater than that in the target state, and accordingly their ability to impact the host nation are much greater.

⁶³ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," 49.




Figure 1. Life Cycle of LIC and of a Terrorist Organization

E. CONCLUSION

Any support of insurgency initially starts as a conscious policy towards a desired end state. To begin with, it is easy to calibrate the level and scope of support that is intended for insurgencies across the border. The unpredictable part of the process begins once the effect of the insurgency is felt by the target country in particular and the international community in general. The reaction by the affected country and the response of international community together

produce unique conditions, which tend to bottle up the insurgents in the host country. It is under these circumstances that the host nation begins to feel the heat of the monster they helped create, as these jihadi groups turn their attention from outside the state's borders to within them. In the context of Pakistan, these jihadi groups see Islam under attack within Pakistan itself. Earlier, more radical parties and their associated militant groups focused their attention on their own individual agendas, without sharing objectives. However, experts now observe that the distinction among all these groups has blurred and they see considerable continuity of thought and action across most of these organizations.⁶⁴ Another new trend in Pakistan's Islamist groups is the birth of splinter groups, which look down upon their parent organizations for their perceived moderate attitude; accordingly these groups develop a more radical outlook. This cycle ultimately leads to the establishment of more radical groups, which over a period of time morph into terrorist organizations. Both Pakistan and the international community have a stake in stopping the cycle, which breeds terrorism.

⁶⁴ Nicholas Howenstein, "The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: an Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir," Pakistan Security Researcher Unit, February 5, 2008: 9.

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III. INITIAL CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN AND EVOLUTION OF LIC AS A STATE STRATEGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Relations between Pakistan and India on various issues have been strained since independence, with the most contentious of these being Kashmir. They have fought three full-scale wars, in 1947 and 1965 over Kashmir, and in 1971 on both Western and Eastern fronts, which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh, and finally a localized war in 1999 in the Kargil Sector. While Pakistan was beaten back each time, it has always looked at options to stop this one-sided conflict and come out the victor. Under these circumstances, it is important to understand the changing dynamics in the Indo-Pak context, which forced Pakistan's increased reliance on LIC as the most viable means of annexing Kashmir. It is also important to understand the unique domestic circumstances in India, and the international situation around Pakistan, which led Pakistan to greatly enhance the LIC in India in the 1990s.

A number of experts have attempted to decipher and understand the seemingly unending conflict between India and Pakistan. Ganguly argues that “the immediate precipitants of wars in the region were all opportunistic events: in each case, one or both parties saw significant opportunities at critical historical junctures to damage the other’s fundamental claims either to the territory of Kashmir or to the larger project of state construction.”⁶⁵ From the beginning, the Pakistani Army always saw itself as a superior force. Pakistani leadership grossly underestimated the capability of Indian political and military leadership. The bane of Pakistan was its poor understanding of relative military strength, the will of his opponents, and the support it could obtain from its allies. Alluding to this, Stephen Van Evera explains:

⁶⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 6.

[c]hauvinist nationalism is the prime source of false optimism about the balance of will. Nationalist propaganda often inflates the bravery of one's own people and denigrates the opponents toughness and character... Such propaganda is bound to foster illusions about one's own fortitude and that of others. Nationalist mythology exaggerates the righteousness of the national cause, leading groups to be misled about the balance of legitimacy between their own, and their adversary's claims. The balance of legitimacy, in turn, helps shape the balance of will.⁶⁶

Pakistan, from the time of its independence, was never at ease with its larger, more powerful neighbor, India. "Pakistan has shown unmistakable propensity in not accepting India's conventional military and nuclear superiority."⁶⁷ To offset this conventional military superiority, Pakistan has repeatedly looked at the use of irregulars as a conscious strategy in achieving politico-military objectives. Its ability to use this strategy effectively has been influenced by domestic, regional, and international events. A study of these events is essential to understand Pakistan's strategy of using LIC as a conscious policy to achieve its desired goals.

B. PARTITION OF BRITISH INDIA

Pakistan, like all newborn nations, had its share of birth pangs, and the trauma of partition was further aggravated by the large-scale influx of Muslims from across India with a corresponding exodus of a productive Hindu population out of its territory. In the partition line drawn by the British, Pakistan "inherited 23 percent of the landmass of undivided India and 18 percent of the population."⁶⁸ Pakistan began its journey with certain obvious shortcomings, such as a lack of legitimacy, as it was India that was the true inheritor of the British Raj, and Pakistan was a state that was carved out of it. Pakistan had to begin its existence

⁶⁶ Steven Van Evera, *Causes of War* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001) 26.

⁶⁷ R.S.N. Singh, "Use of Irregulars: Bane for the Pakistani Army," *Indian Defense Review*, 2008: 6.

⁶⁸ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998) 95.

by applying for various international memberships, a few of which were granted automatically to India. Pakistan's strategic deficit was also in terms of its industrial base, as "colonial industrial development had clustered around Bombay, Ahmadabad, Calcutta and the West Bengal/Bihar coal belt, leaving Pakistan with just 10 percent of the industrial base."⁶⁹ Partition also separated Pakistani raw material from its traditional markets and factories in India.

Strategically, Pakistan faced many challenges, such as the creation of East Pakistan some 1,000 miles away from West Pakistan. It also had to contend with a lawless tribal population on the Afghan border, with the government in Kabul not exactly recognizing the border with Pakistan. Politically, Pakistan's Muslim League was not as well organized as the Indian National Congress. As Ayesha Jalal points out, "the League's weakness meant that Pakistani politicians had to concede much greater autonomy to the administrative bureaucracy, to consolidate state authority than did their Indian counterparts."⁷⁰ Pakistan also bore the additional burden of establishing a new provincial government at Dhaka in East Pakistan.

Pakistan's experiments with democracy have been marked by a "multi-layered trajectory of contrasts and contradictions, be [they] in the social, political and/or economic domains since the very inception of the country."⁷¹ Pakistan, from the beginning, was concerned about issues like Kashmir, the division of assets between the two states, and also the threat of a seemingly ominous neighbor, India. There was a sense of inferiority and insecurity in the psyche of the Pakistani leadership that arose immediately after independence. This feeling was further fuelled by delays in the transfer of assets from India to Pakistan.

The events in Kashmir immediately after independence raised doubts and apprehensions in the minds of both India and Pakistan. For the next half-century,

⁶⁹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 97.

⁷⁰ Ibid.,100.

⁷¹ Gregor Enste, *Pakistan: Reality, Denial and the Complexity of its State*, (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2009), 9.

Kashmir was to become the bone of contention, and the *raison d'être* for conflict in the region. Despite having lasted for more than 60 years, the issue of Kashmir still remains fresh in the minds of both Pakistan and India, with no viable solution.

C. EVENTS INSTRUMENTAL IN EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGY OF LIC

1. The Kashmir War of 1947–48

This part of the chapter will briefly examine some of the important events that led up to the Kashmir War in 1947. As part of the British plan for partition of India, it was decided to allow the rulers of the 565 princely states that had previously recognized the Paramountcy of the British crown to determine the future of their territories by fiat. The princely states were given a choice to either join India or Pakistan, or to opt for independence. The princes were advised by British Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, who was responsible for overseeing the partition process, to consider territorial contiguity and the religious affiliations of their subjects.⁷² The situation in Kashmir was unique, as a Hindu Maharaja ruled a predominantly Muslim state, and was further complicated by the fact that Kashmir shared borders with both India and Pakistan. Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, wanted independence, much against the advice of Mountbatten who had counseled that it would be in their own interest to accede to one of the two new states. From the beginning, Mohamed Ali Jinnah had campaigned in Kashmir for its accession to Pakistan. It is also believed that the Muslim intelligentsia and clergy in the Kashmir Valley supported the Muslim League.⁷³ On the other hand, the Hindus of Jammu and the Buddhists of Ladakh were not pleased with the idea of being part of a Muslim state. In addition, the vast majority of the Kashmiri Muslims, who were mostly poor peasants, saw a brighter economic future in India.⁷⁴

⁷² Alice Thorner, "The Issues in Kashmir," *Far Eastern Survey*, 1948: 173.

⁷³ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 15.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 16.

Immediately after the partition, the Maharaja of Kashmir was under intense pressure from both India and Pakistan to join their fold. The Maharaja refused to accede to either side, but he did sign a “standstill agreement” with Pakistan that enabled the two states to carry on with certain basic commercial transactions. “Meanwhile, during the first week of October 1947 tribal rebellion broke out in Poonch district of Kashmir. Sections of the Pakistani army quickly moved to aid the rebels with arms, transport and men.”⁷⁵ The weak forces of the Maharaja were unable to stop the onslaught of the tribals, who were assisted by the regular army. Within two weeks this group was on the outskirts of Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The Maharaja, who was by now in a state of shock, asked for Indian military help to stop the tribals from advancing further. The Indian prime minister, Nehru, agreed to provide assistance only if two preconditions were met: the Maharaja must agree to join India and this decision must have the approval of Sheikh Abdullah. On October 26, once the Maharaja had signed the instrument of accession and Abdullah gave his approval, Nehru instructed Indian troops to be airlifted into Kashmir.⁷⁶ Thus began the Kashmir War, which ultimately led to the division of Kashmir into two parts.

The Indian Army was able to stop the marauding tribals and push them back to a considerable distance. By December 1947, the Indian Army was facing logistical difficulties and the pace of operations had reduced. By this point, the Pakistani Army was fully involved in the battle for Kashmir and was also simultaneously threatening to cut off the link between Amritsar and Jammu by concentrating a large force in the area. India at this stage was conscious that it could not make further headway, unless Pakistan stopped supporting the tribals. The advance of the tribesmen, duly supported by the Pakistani Army, into Kashmir was to trigger a series of events, which would fundamentally alter the security situation in the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan officially entered the battle for Kashmir in May 1948, on the plea that Pakistan could not be a viable state if

⁷⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 16.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 17.

India controlled Kashmir in its entirety.⁷⁷ The use of rebels or infiltrators by Pakistan in this war was more out of necessity than by any grand design or strategy. The Pakistani Army at this stage was still being led by British officers and the junior Pakistani officers could ill afford to take the British into confidence before launching an attack on Kashmir.

While Pakistan was not able to capture the prized “Valley,” it was able to gain control over a sizeable area of Kashmir. It was in this encounter that Pakistan learned the usefulness of LIC, as they found it cheaper and the deniability factor was built into the methodology of operations. Pakistan accordingly never accepted its involvement in the conflict from October 1947 to May 1948, and called the entire action an indigenous movement. The Pakistani government best understood the power and convenience of deniability, and it was to become the cornerstone of Pakistani policy towards India, Afghanistan, and the United States and, later on, the rest of the world.

2. The Indo Pakistani war of 1965

Pakistan launched a two-stage military operation into Kashmir in August 1965. The first stage involved the infiltration of a large number of insurgents across the cease-fire line with the aim of capturing the radio station and the Srinagar airport. The second stage of military invasion of Kashmir was conceived as a way of building on the gains accomplished in the first stage. The Pakistani military was of the opinion that the insurgents would create zones of liberated areas, which would allow the regular forces to walk through Kashmir. In response to this action, the Indian Army expanded the scope of war by attacking across the international border in the area of Lahore. The Pakistani Army immediately took defensive action to protect the city by destroying a large number of bridges on the canal that surrounded it. The Indian strategy of expanding the war beyond Kashmir was not in Pakistan’s calculus and Pakistan was accordingly not as well prepared for it. In this war, non-state the actors were not able to make major

⁷⁷ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in the Crossfire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1966) 157.

contributions to the primary objective, and Pakistan underestimated the resolve of India, to protect its claim over Kashmir, even if it meant expanding the scope of operations to sectors beyond Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan learned two important lessons from this war. First, it could not impose its will militarily on India to achieve the surrender of Kashmir. Second, the ability of rebels/infiltrators to cause an uprising within the state of Kashmir was contingent on existence of significant discord and animosity against the local government. In the absence of such animosity, the rebels had limited sustainability and hence could not achieve their desired end. Even in this war, Pakistan could not unleash the full potential of an LIC, as the situation was not ripe for exploitation. Pakistan attributed the stalemate to the inadequate indoctrination of the Kashmiri population, which largely contributed to the lack of popular support for the tribal invasion. Accordingly, Pakistan continued to hedge on the usefulness of irregulars in achieving its strategic aims, and in addition, began looking at options for the creation of the “right environment” in Kashmir to facilitate an LIC.

3. The Bangladesh War of 1971

The nature and the origins of the 1971 war were very different from the two earlier military engagements between India and Pakistan. While Pakistan initiated the first two wars, it was India that took the initiative in 1971. The basic causes of this conflict lay in the complexities of Pakistani domestic politics. Analyzing the situation in South Asia, Ganguly notes:

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s first democratic elections in October 1970, a long-standing demand for regional autonomy gathered considerable force in East Pakistan. Soon thereafter negotiations over power-sharing reached a deadlock. Unable to break this deadlock, the military regime of General Yahya Khan resorted to the extensive use of deadly force against the East Pakistani

population [which was primarily ethnically Bengali], thereby precipitating a full-scale civil war by March-April 1971.⁷⁸

The West Pakistani forces launched “Operation Searchlight” in March 1971, which was basically focused on the Bengali population of Dhaka and its neighborhood. “The main aim of this operation was to decimate sources of political opposition to the military regime in West Pakistan. The brutality and the scale of this military operation against the civilian population were unparalleled in the history of South Asia.”⁷⁹ The immediate impact of the Civil War was the influx of over 10 million refugees into India. Indian policymakers were of the opinion that it was cheaper to wage war with Pakistan than to manage and maintain the refugee population.

India initially described its intervention in East Pakistan as one of humanitarian aid. It is true that Indian intervention did end the loss of lives in the military crackdown of East Pakistan, but it must also be noted that India exploited a window of opportunity provided by Pakistan. India was aware that a divided Pakistan would be less of a threat in the future, as it would not be faced with a two-front war. In addition, the creation of Bangladesh was to fundamentally question the two-nation theory based on Islam, a concept so avidly propagated by Pakistan during partition. While the bond of Islam existed between East and West Pakistan, there were tremendous inequalities at the social, economic, and political levels. The people of East Pakistan had never been reconciled to the imposition of Urdu as the national language over a predominantly Bengali-speaking population, and the proud Bengalis considered it an affront to their linguistic and intellectual heritage. The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation was always written on the wall, and the Indian action was merely a catalyst that hastened the process. Ganguly observes:

[t]he euphoria of India’s decisive victory over Pakistan lasted for a considerable span of time. Between 1972 and 1983, various

⁷⁸ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 51.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 60.

governments in New Delhi showed skill, tact, and intelligence in dealing with the internal dimension of the Kashmir problem. From 1984 onwards, however, they returned to the extraordinary clumsiness, thoughtlessness, and downright deceit that had characterized domestic policy towards Kashmir in the 1950s and 1960s. These highly uneven policies of accommodation and manipulation ultimately culminated in an ethno-religious insurgency in December 1989 that once again gave Pakistan a chance to pry Kashmir out of the Indian Union.⁸⁰

The War of 1971 effectively closed Pakistan's military options for capturing Kashmir. Pakistan then began a serious search for alternate options to achieve its strategic goal of annexing Kashmir. The trauma and intensity of defeat of 1971, as well as the domestic political situation, did not give Pakistan a window of opportunity to look seriously at India for the next two decades. It also lay to rest the misplaced myth of Pakistani military superiority.

4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: 1979

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had significant effects on both Pakistan and India. Pakistan technically faced threats on both its borders. On one side was the Soviet-installed regime of Babrak Karmal and on the other side was India, which was uncomfortable with the new military regime of General Zia.⁸¹ The general, through some tactical handling on the part of the United States, was able to garner substantial economic and military aid in exchange for lending support to the U.S. in Afghanistan. The next decade saw significant domestic and international activity in the region, which had long-term implications for both South Asia and the international community. It was during this period that the United States increasingly relied on Pakistan to meet its strategic needs in Afghanistan against the Soviets, and correspondingly India bet on the Soviets to checkmate a Pakistan-U.S. partnership. The United States committed close to

⁸⁰ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 74.

⁸¹ Ibid., 79.

U.S. \$5 billion between 1980 and 1992 in aid to the mujahedin; all of this funding was routed through Pakistan's ISI.⁸² The ISI's level of involvement can be gauged through Gregory's observation:

[t]he crucial development for the ISI was the decision by the United States, through the CIA, to use Pakistan's ISI as the instrument of support for the Afghan rebels. The ISI already had deep inroads into Afghanistan and laid down strict conditions, which the CIA accepted, that the ISI would control almost all aspects of how the guerrilla war was fought and supported. The ISI insisted that it would retain control over contracts with Afghan rebels, that no Americans [CIA included] would cross the Afghan border from Pakistan, that movements of weapons within Pakistan and their disbursement to the Afghani groups would be handled exclusively by the ISI, and that all training of Afghan rebels would be handled by the ISI.⁸³

America's willingness to agree to the terms laid down by the Pakistani ISI greatly assisted Pakistan in siphoning off a large quantum of aid and weapons for deployment in its area of interest both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. This de-facto set the stage for successful orchestration of LIC in Kashmir. By the late 1980s, Pakistan was out of the shadows of the 1971 war, had a modicum of international support, was well-endowed with military hardware, and had a pool of trained mujahedeen; the only aspect missing for launch of an LIC in Kashmir was a favorable environment, which the Indians were soon to offer.

5. The Punjab Militancy

The Khalistani separatist insurgency in the Punjab was driven both by certain historical facts and political developments in the region in the early 1980s. Pakistan, under General Zia, with its newfound support from the United States was fully poised to exploit the situation in the Punjab. "General Zia sought to raise the cost of insurgency for the Indian state by covertly aiding the

⁸² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 18.

⁸³ Shaun Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2007: 1016.

insurgents.”⁸⁴ By the late 1980s, large parts of the Punjab were affected by terrorist activity, taking a substantial toll on Punjabi police forces in the beginning, as well as, to a certain degree, the Indian military. It was against this backdrop that India launched a 1987 military exercise code-named “Brasstacks.” While this exercise was ostensibly to test the newly-introduced mechanized units of the Indian Army, it was also an exercise in coercive diplomacy, designed to stop Pakistan from interfering in the Punjab. Some of these events of 1980 led Pakistan to believe that it could launch LIC against India, as it had sufficient conventional military power to deter India, against a *de facto* nuclear backdrop. This realization by Pakistan, and the beginnings of the domestic problem in Kashmir, were to provide both a new dimension and a clear incentive for the instigation of an LIC in India.

6. The Jammu and Kashmir Militancy

A combination of poor political direction from the center and inept handling of the domestic situation by the state government of Kashmir led to the beginning of a new wave of militancy in the Kashmir Valley. Until the early 1990s, “[m]ost commentators agreed that the primary cause of the Kashmir insurgency could be found in India’s domestic affairs. Pakistani support for the militants was typically viewed as an important, but secondary factor in the Kashmiri question.”⁸⁵ The events of January 1990, when Srinagar police fired into a demonstration, killing 32 people, “transformed the Kashmiri insurgency, from a mainly Indian affair, into renewed Indo-Pakistani conflict”.⁸⁶ According to U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley:

Pakistan, willy-nilly, began to play a much more active role. Unofficially, groups such as Jamaat-I Islami [an Islamic political party] as well as ISI and the Pakistani Army began to take a more

⁸⁴ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* , 85.

⁸⁵ Devin Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia* (Cambridge: MIT press, 1998), 139.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*,140.

active role in support to the Kashmiri protests. Training camps of various kinds multiplied.... There was much more activity. There were more people and more material going across the border from Pakistan into Kashmir.⁸⁷

Benazir Bhutto further raised the stakes in Kashmir when she announced the creation of a \$4 million fund to support the “freedom fighters” across the Line of Actual Control.⁸⁸ The situation in Kashmir clearly gave Pakistan a window of opportunity and it willingly transferred jihadis from the Afghanistan front to the Kashmir Valley. Simultaneously, Pakistan began to orchestrate the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan with the aim of installing a pro-Pakistani, Pashtun-led Islamist government. As Gregory notes:

[f]rom the late 1980s, the ISI launched a more assertive strategy to destabilize Jammu and Kashmir. The pertinent elements of this plan were fourfold: [a] to divert arms and ammunition from the Afghan conflict-including many of those siphoned off during the Afghan War by the ISI-and use the weapons to empower favored J&K separatist groups; [b] to expand the number of Madaris and training camps inside Pakistan administered Kashmir to boost the number of trained and indoctrinated fighters who could be infiltrated into Indian controlled territory; [c] to transit Afghan and international Muslim fighters from Afghan conflict to the new pan-Islamist “holy war” in Jammu and Kashmir, and [d] to create new militant organizations that could become the vehicles for ISI control of the separatist insurgency.⁸⁹

The effect of Pakistan’s policies, along with the repressive tactics of India’s counterinsurgency led to a spiral of violence, which cost more than 50,000 lives.⁹⁰ The two seemingly-unrelated events, the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and internal disturbances in the state of Jammu Kashmir, provided Pakistan with a unique opportunity. Pakistan saw the convergence of its aims and opportunities in Kashmir and it did not want to miss out. The exploitation of

⁸⁷ Devin Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*, 140.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 144.

⁸⁹ Shaun Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," 7.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

this opportunity clearly meant a quantum jump in its overt and covert involvement in Jammu and Kashmir. "It was also an excellent opportunity to impose significant materials and other costs in India at little cost to themselves."⁹¹ Thus, it would not be incorrect to say that 1990 was the beginning of a new chapter of Pakistan's intense involvement in LIC in both Kashmir and Afghanistan.

7. The Period from 1990 to 2009

The 1990s saw a substantial increase in Pakistan's involvement, both in Afghanistan and, Jammu and Kashmir. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan was heavily involved in the establishment of a pro-Taliban government in Kabul. Both the Pakistani Army and the ISI had recognized that a friendly government in Kabul was essential in making Pakistan's Western flank secure, so that it could concentrate its energy in the East near the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Its presence in Afghanistan was also considered essential to providing strategic depth in the case of an Indian offensive.⁹² To this end, Pakistan provided the Taliban with all necessary help in terms of weapons, logistics, finance, and political support.

The democratically-elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had subordinated themselves to the military on most foreign policy issues, with the most important being the situation along both its borders. On the Indian front, the situation in Kashmir continued to deteriorate throughout the 1990s, partly because of Pakistan's active support for the militants, and also due to poor handling of the state by the Indian government.⁹³ The situation slowly began to change in the second half of the 1990s, when the Pakistan-aided insurgency slowly began to wane, as the Indian Army began to take control of the situation and India was able to hold three successful elections in Kashmir. It was around

⁹¹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 92.

⁹² Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," 53.

⁹³ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 91.

this time that Pakistan began its misadventure in Kargil by sending its Northern light infantry, disguised as mujahedin, to occupy key terrain features overlooking the strategically-important road connecting Srinagar and Leh. The aim of this operation was to rekindle the Kashmir conflict and refocus the attention of the international community on the Kashmiri situation.⁹⁴ Pakistan was also emboldened by its newfound status as a nuclear weapons state. With this operation, Pakistan stretched the envelope of LIC to a level that was unacceptable to India. Accordingly, India responded conventionally with the use of both its ground and air assets to dislodge the infiltrators.

In this entire operation, Pakistan received no international support, although India's actions were looked at more sympathetically. The ferocious attacks of the Indian Army, the tough stance taken by the United States, along with the uncompromising attitude of the Indian political leadership, finally facilitated in the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. With this, Pakistan finally became conscious of its own capabilities and limitations. While the 1971 operations had shown its limitations on the conventional front, the conflict of 1999 showed the extent to which the concept of LIC could be stretched. Thus, the only option left for Pakistan was to continue with calibrated low levels of LIC, which would not raise the ante for India and the international community, and at the same time sufficiently bleed India.

The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the rapid mobilization by India, followed by Pakistan, and the subsequent diffusion of tension highlighted the relevance of nuclear deterrence.⁹⁵ Kux comments:

[w]ith the temperature between Islamabad and New Delhi nearing a boil, Musharraf announced a major policy shift on January 12, 2002. By stating that his country would no longer be a base for foreign terrorism, the Pakistani leader implicitly pledged to end ISI support for attacks across the Line of Control. Musharraf also hit

⁹⁴Ashley J. Tellis, et al., *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis*, Monograph (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 5.

⁹⁵Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," 51-55.

hard at domestic Islamic fundamentalists, calling for an end to the extremism and violence that have wracked Pakistan in recent years. Although privately pleased with the speech, the Indian government's official reaction emphasized that Musharraf's words needed to be translated into deeds before India would lower its guard.⁹⁶

The attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent the United States GWOT had far-reaching consequences for the security situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which had been an active supporter of the Taliban in Afghanistan, had to change its policies and had to realign its policies to be in tune with U.S. aims and aspirations. "Pakistan became a 'valued ally' in the U.S. fight against terrorism."⁹⁷ Pakistan provided a much-needed logistic base for the United States operations in Afghanistan aimed at the capture of Osama bin Laden. While General Musharraf was forthcoming with his support for the U.S., many groups and individuals within Pakistan did not support his decision. The most vociferous opposition was from Islamic radical parties such as Jamaat-I-Islami, Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam and, internally, from elements of the ISI which were sympathetic to the Taliban. Pakistan began fighting the Taliban, albeit reluctantly, because they needed U.S. support and economic aid. This change in stand created immense unease and distrust between the government and the Muslim clergy (who controlled the insurgent and terrorist groups).

D. Conclusion

The acrimonious relationship between Pakistan and India can be traced back to the time of independence, but it is the period after 1971 that stands out in regards to Pakistan's strategy of using LIC as a state strategy against India. The use of irregulars to offset India's conventional military superiority became a necessity in the aftermath of the 1971 debacle in East Pakistan. The process started by General Zia with India as the target, soon found a testing ground in

⁹⁶Dennis Kux, *Heinonline*, 2002, <http://heinonline.org/HOL/landingpage?collection=journals&handles=hein.journals/for81&div=50&id=&page=> (accessed August 26, 2010).

⁹⁷Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, 139.

Afghanistan, when the United States expressed its desire to force the Soviets out, using Pakistan as the launch pad and the mujahedin as the preferred tool of war. Pakistan used this unique opportunity to establish a well-oiled mechanism to train and indoctrinate a large pool of fighters, who were ready to take battle to either side of its borders. This period was also used by the Pakistani Army and the ISI, to siphon off large amounts of aid and military hardware. India's poor handling of the internal situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s gave Pakistan an opportunity to transfer its attention to fomenting trouble in the Kashmir region of India. It was thus that the 1990s saw Pakistan's complete involvement in aiding and abetting the insurgency, with the aim of weakening India, tying down the Indian Armed Forces, and ultimately aiming wrest control of Kashmir from India.

The counterinsurgency operations launched by India began to take effect in the late 1990s, along with a simultaneous deterioration in the Internal situation in Pakistan. Pakistan's 1999 adventure in Kargil was an expression of its frustration with the course of events in its neighborhood. The next major event that was to alter Pakistan's security situation was the 9/11 attack in the United States and Pakistan's decision to support the U.S. in the GWOT. This meant a clear turnaround in Pakistan's support of the Taliban in Afghanistan and substantial pressure to reduce its operations in Kashmir. This "bottling in" effect from both sides, was a defining moment for Pakistan as it led to the beginning of Jihad within Pakistan, and to a spiraling state of instability. While Pakistan's policies post-2000 did yield considerable U.S. economic and military aid, it slowly began to pay a heavy price in terms of a deteriorating domestic security situation.

IV. EFFECT OF LIC ON PAKISTAN'S WELL-BEING

A. INTRODUCTION

Pakistan saw fomenting trouble in Jammu and Kashmir and other North Eastern states of India as a “low-cost, high-gain option.” In effect, sponsoring insurgency in India was seen as a means of balancing the asymmetries (through the philosophy of a war by thousand cuts) between the two countries.⁹⁸ Pakistan achieved a certain amount of success in stymieing India’s growth, keeping the Kashmir issue alive, and tying down the Indian Army in the Kashmir valley. A recent Rand Corporation report argued, “the use of militant groups, including the Taliban, has remained an important instrument for Pakistan’s security forces in its regional strategy.”⁹⁹ On the issue of LIC, Schofield comments:

[a]fter Pakistan’s own military attempts in 1947-1949 and in 1965 had failed, the idea of conducting a proxy war on indigenous dissent was a low-cost, potentially high-yielding alternative. Even though there was no question of Pakistan ideologically supporting a movement that aspired to gain independence, it was felt that any group that was working to destabilize India’s control of the state would be beneficial to Pakistan. If nothing else were achieved, it would be revenge in return for the assistance India had given to East Pakistan in 1971 leading to the cessation and the creation of independent Bangladesh.¹⁰⁰

This thesis’s argument is that the policy of LIC may offer short-term benefits, but can prove disastrous in the long-term. Short-term benefits can be easily perceived and are often apparent and politically expedient, but long-term impacts are generally difficult to fathom and are not obvious to policy makers or the general public. The impact of LIC on the host nation can often be a very slow process, and can be compared to a low-level virus attack with a long gestation

⁹⁸ Peter Chalk, "Pakistan's Role in Kashmir Insurgency," 1.

⁹⁹ Christine Fair, *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State*, xiv.

¹⁰⁰ Victoria Schofield, "Kashmir Separatism and Pakistan in the Current Global Environment," *Contemporary South Asia*, 2008: 83.

period. By the time its effects appear, it can be difficult to trace its causal origins, and it can be even more difficult to comprehend the “cause-effect” relationship. Having invested in a seemingly winning strategy, it can be near-suicidal for politicians and Pakistan’s armed forces to change course. Thus, this strategy of abetting LIC has the potential to toss a nation in an unrecoverable tailspin. LIC, when used as a state strategy, is now viewed with great suspicion by the international community in the new globalized, post-9/11 world. To make an objective assessment of the effects of LIC on Pakistan, it is also important to examine LIC’s impact on India, the target of Pakistan’s LIC initiatives.

B. EFFECT OF LIC ON INDIA

1. Economic Costs

In response to the Pakistan-aided insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and a few other states, India needed to raise the level of troop strength that was already fighting a low-level insurgency in Kashmir. Its basic counterterrorism strategy was to bring the level of insurgency to a level where the state administration could get back on its feet and begin functioning. Over the last two decades, Pakistan made every possible effort to derail this process through funding terrorists, controlling infiltration, creating propaganda, and finally by increasing the level of violence unleashed by foreign militants. This led India to deploy a large contingent of its army and the creation of a special counterinsurgency force called the “Rastriya Rifles” which together cost India approximately \$3 billion annually in 1999.¹⁰¹ This also led to the construction of the 2,019 km long border fence costing approximately \$300 million along the entire length of Indo-Pakistan border.¹⁰² These costs for a growing economy like India’s were substantial, as these resources could have been better used for

¹⁰¹Gautam Navlakha, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 20 (May 15–21, 1999), 1171.

¹⁰²Ministry of Home Affairs, India, [http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_Fenc\(E\).pdf](http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_Fenc(E).pdf), (accessed May 14, 2010), 5.

essential sectors like health, education, or infrastructure development. The occasional Pakistan-supported terrorist actions in India are also a cause for concern, as it impacts investor confidence and in turn has direct influence on (Foreign Direct Investment) FDI. As a result, there is a general acceptance that state-sponsored terrorism, as is being attempted by Pakistan across national boundaries in India, is paying some dividends to Pakistan.¹⁰³

2. Human Costs

The impact of LIC in the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been felt both by civilians and security forces operating in the area. In addition to human casualties, the state has generated a large number of refugees who have migrated to other parts of India, and internally it has led to economic stagnation. The main economic activity in the state, i.e., tourism, has been adversely affected by terrorism. "Narcotrafficking, indulged in by the terrorists to finance the operations, has also been an unwelcome consequence."¹⁰⁴

Low-intensity conflict operations are typically characterized by limited use of force and accordingly a soldier who is trained in the use of lethal force finds himself in an alien environment. In the Indian context, the soldier does not encounter an enemy but his own fellow citizen. This kind of ambiguous situation increases the stress level of soldiers participating in an LIC. In addition, the "ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success, [and] high casualty rates tend to erode morale among security forces. Several operational factors such as fatigue, unpredictability of threat, extended tenure of stay, absence of recreational avenues, domestic worries, and problems related to leave increase the level of frustration."¹⁰⁵ The unique aspects of an LIC are that operations are conducted with no secure firm bases, and along insecure lines of communications, over

103 Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 317.

104 K.P.S.Gill, *Jammu and Kashmir Backgrounder*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/backgrounder/index.html> (accessed August 28, 2010).

105 D.S. Goel, Harcharan Singh, and Suprakash Chaudhary, "Psychological effects of low intensity conflict operations," *Indian Journal of Psychiatry*, 2006: 223.

protracted periods of time. This kind of deployment has both short-term and long-term consequences for both the individual soldier and his extended family. While this issue of psychological impact is being discussed in the Indian context, the same effects are also applicable to Pakistani forces fighting insurgencies within their country. While India entered into counterinsurgency operations in a phased manner, Pakistan has been pushed into this battle in a rather unexpected manner. Accordingly, the challenges being faced by Pakistan are far more difficult and uncertain. The details of insurgency-related deaths of terrorists, the security forces, and the civilians in Jammu and Kashmir are detailed in Figure 2.¹⁰⁶ The graph clearly highlights the escalation of violence in India in the post-1990s.




Figure 2. Insurgency Related Killings: 1988–2000

3. Internationalization of Kashmir Issue

One of the main achievements of a Pakistan-aided LIC in Kashmir is that it has been able to keep the issue of Kashmir alive in international forums. Both the insurgent/terrorist activities aided by Pakistan and India's counterinsurgency activities routinely make headlines in international media. In addition, India has not been able to incorporate Kashmir as a "normal" state into the Indian union.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ K.P.S. Gill, *Jammu and Kashmir Backgrounder* (accessed August 28, 2010).

¹⁰⁷ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 156.

While there was certain amount of sympathy and understanding for Pakistan's cause in Kashmir, this has been lost or reduced in the last two decades due to Pakistan's overindulgence in its strategy of LIC.¹⁰⁸ The world at large is averse to the idea of redrawing international borders, and any coercive methodology or policy towards achievement of this end is not looked at sympathetically.

C. EFFECT OF LIC ON PAKISTAN

Since independence, Pakistan has gone through regular cycles of democratic and military rule. These regime changes were mostly driven by internal political dynamics, and the military often took control of the state with the excuse that politicians were no longer in control of the situation. Within a few years, power would be transferred back to a civilian government, on the grounds of inefficiency and mismanagement by the military, albeit with a certain amount of international help. Between independence and 1980, non-state actors had limited or no role to play within Pakistani politics, as they were only used as a vanguard for a conventional conflict, as in 1947 and 1965. The infusion of non-state actors in the political center stage began with Pakistani involvement in providing aid to mujahedin in Afghanistan.

By the end of the decade, Pakistan was home to a large pool of well-trained, battle-hardened, and religiously indoctrinated fighters with no clear aim or purpose. This was also the time when trouble was brewing in the Indian area of Kashmir, and Pakistan clearly saw an opportunity to use this trained group. The initial success of these groups in the state of Jammu and Kashmir emboldened Pakistan to increase its recruitment base across the state. This began a new chapter in Pakistan's direct involvement in state sponsorship of insurgency with the ISI acting as the main coordinating agency. This was also the time when Pakistan became heavily involved in supporting the Afghan Taliban to take control of Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan was effectively involved in aiding and

¹⁰⁸ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 156.

abetting LIC on both its borders. The Pakistan of the 1990s was a state deeply embroiled in ethnic tension, sectarian violence, and a clear lack of cohesive central rule. Cohen, explaining the situation in Pakistan, notes:

Pakistan's Islamic extremists are a mixed lot. Some are criminals wrapped in the mantle of divine justice; some have modest Pakistani related objectives; and others are seized with sectarian hatred. The radical groups' theological origins inherently divide them, and although most are Deobandis, some are not, including the extremely violent Shia groups. Nevertheless, all these groups tend to splinter in ways reminiscent of the extreme right and left in other parts of the world, and a burning sense of injustice may motivate a few foreign born radicals to join them. These groups expend their energy on ordinary Pakistani citizens or on one another; or they direct their efforts-usually with government assistance-towards India and, until recently, Afghanistan. Some radical Islamic groups are linked to more mainstream political movements or serve as the fighting or terrorist arm of such movements.¹⁰⁹

The scale of terrorist violence within Pakistan can be estimated by looking at fatalities over the last few decades. The high rate of acceleration of violence is an indicator of Pakistan's looming loss of control. This period also saw a dramatic increase in suicide attacks. In 2002, there were 22 suicide attacks; this number rose to 56 in 2007, and to 59 in 2008.¹¹⁰ Figures 3 and 4¹¹¹ show terrorism-related incidents and the casualty pattern in Pakistan for the period from 1970 to 2010. The graphs clearly indicate high rates of terrorist incidents after 1990, when compared to the previous two decades. There is a fairly definitive correlation between Pakistan's involvements in LIC across its borders during this period, with a corresponding increase in instability within the state.

¹⁰⁹Stephen P. Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 13.

¹¹⁰South Asia Terrorism Portel, *Pakistan Assessment 2010*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm> (accessed Jun 4, 2010).

¹¹¹Syed Ejaz Hussain, *Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns, Terrorists' Characteristics, and the Impact of Terrorism Arrests on Terrorism*, Dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 2010) 22.




Figure 3. Terrorism Incidents in Pakistan




Figure 4. Killed and Wounded in Terrorism

D. EFFECT ON STABILITY

1. Radicalization and Its Effect on Stability

Pakistan's experiments with Islamic extremism took root under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, as he systematically promoted Islamization as a cover for his own autocratic tendencies; this continued until he was deposed by General Zia in 1977.¹¹² General Zia, himself a devout Muslim, had views which were in alignment with Jammat-e-Islami; he was also the first army chief to openly praise and support Islamic groups. Zia was also instrumental in providing training and economic support to the most radical and yet militarily effective Islamic groups in the war to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. Most of these radical groups had ties with counterparts in Pakistani cities such as Peshawar, and other parts of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP).¹¹³ Over a period of time a symbiotic relationship was established between militants operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and with extremist organizations within Pakistan. Even today, the Pakistani military provides overt and strategic support to the country's Islamic fundamentalists, but this approach appears to be backfiring as these very radicals are mounting a challenge to central power. They routinely disrupt Parliamentary work along with some secular opposition parties. With the breakdown of law and order, the state has become less and less relevant in the lives of ordinary people.¹¹⁴ As the state becomes less relevant, one sees a corresponding rise in the importance of non-state entities such as radical Islamic parties, and once the power and importance of these groups crosses a threshold,

¹¹²Stephen P. Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, 15.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Robert Looney, "Failed Economic Takeoffs and Terrorism in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, November 2004: 792.

the state invariably intervenes and tries to take control of the situation, without making any fundamental changes in governance. Thus, an increase in the role of the state, with a corresponding decline in governance, is a sure recipe for another cycle of violence.¹¹⁵

The Pakistani government has shown a marked reluctance to identify and take action against radical Islamic organizations. In January 2002, the government banned JeM and LeT under U.S. pressure, but these organizations reappeared with new names after lying dormant for a while. The Sharif government sought the help of LeT in containing the Deobandi groups, while the Musharraf government looked the other way as radical groups tormented India in Kashmir. Cohen argues, “[I]t will not be radical Islamic groups that threaten the basic stability of Pakistan, but the state organs that encourage them.”¹¹⁶ From the above discussion it is clear that breeding terrorism at home for export alone is a fallacy, as homegrown terrorists often find a domestic market.

2. Pakistan Military Operations in NWFP and its Impact

In the last decade, the Pakistani Army has been challenged within its own country by the Taliban/Al Qaeda-led insurgency in the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While the Pakistani Army and the ISI had perfected the art of aiding and abetting terrorism in Afghanistan and in Jammu and Kashmir, they had little or no experience in the nuances of counterinsurgency techniques. This was clearly highlighted in its initial failure to regain control of the Swat Valley.¹¹⁷ Pakistan had to deploy its regular army along with Special Forces, as its initial deployment of paramilitary forces such as the Frontier Corps were unable to control the situation in Waziristan.

¹¹⁵ Robert Looney, "Failed Economic Takeoffs and Terrorism in Pakistan," 778.

¹¹⁶ Stephen P. Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, 15.

¹¹⁷ Gurmeet Kanwal, *Losing Ground: Pak Army Strategy in FATA and NWFP*, Issue Brief (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2008).

The Pakistani Army launched major operations to regain “liberated areas” with the use of massive firepower, both from the ground and the air. “This heavy-handed firepower based approach without simultaneous infantry operations failed to dislodge the militants but caused large-scale collateral damage and served to alienate the tribal population even further. Major reverses led to panic reactions including the hurried negotiation of peace accords, the most famous of which was the one signed on September 5, 2006, in the North Waziristan town of Miranshah. As part of this deal, the government of Pakistan was to stop all air and ground operations in Waziristan and in turn the militants were to cease cross-border movement into and out of Pakistan. In addition, tribal leaders were to ensure that no attacks took place on law enforcement personal; tribesmen were permitted to carry small arms but were banned from using heavy weapons. These terms were humiliating for a proud Army to swallow. The peace agreement discussed above was to an extent, a result of United States pressure, but also stemmed from Pakistan’s own desire to rein in some of these tribal areas. The compromise formula struck by Pakistani Army speaks for itself about the state of lawlessness in the frontier regions of Pakistan. Such compromises by the state, with non-state actors, do not help in either improving Pakistan’s stability or its international stature. The Pakistani military has fomented religious militancy as part of its strategy to wrest Kashmir from India, and also to establish a client regime in Afghanistan. Haqqani states, “Unless Islamabad’s objectives are redefined to focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in governance, which the military remains institutionally reluctant to do, the state will continue to turn to Islam as a national unifier.”¹¹⁸ The Pakistani Army, which holds the key to power in Pakistan, can both be the problem and the provider of solutions to the difficulties being faced by the country.

The large number of military operations conducted in different parts of NWFP and FATA has led to the displacement of over two million people who

¹¹⁸ Hussein Haqqani, “The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 2004: 95.

were forced to abandon their homes in search of security and peace.¹¹⁹ Many consider this as the single largest displacement in the history of Pakistan, after partition. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center of the Norwegian Refugee Council:

[t]he causes of displacement have included human rights abuses by militant groups, conflicts between tribal leaders and militant Islamic rivals, and sectarian clashes. But military operations by government forces, sometimes in cooperation with some militant groups, have been the principle cause.¹²⁰

The affected parties in the displacement are composed of a wide variety of people, including Shiite and Sunni activists, as well as Deobandi and Barelvi Sunni activists. These groups are known to have a history of clashes over issues such as the control of land, water resources, and important religious sites. In addition, tribal enmities have often led to clashes between tribal militias, causing short- to long-term displacement.¹²¹ While men and women are equally represented, up to 60 percent of those displaced are children, and it is these children who have the most to lose from displacement. In the absence of state-funded education, it is the Madrassahs which fill in the void and further complicate an already vitiated environment. Children with no education, or a Madrassah education could become vulnerable to militant recruitment.

3. Role of ISI and its Impact

The ISI was formed in 1948 by the British and was to provide a tri-service character to Pakistan's existing military intelligence (MI). Its initial role beyond MI was to gather information on disputed areas in Kashmir and Baltistan.¹²² The

¹¹⁹ Muhamed Amir, *Pakistan Security Report 2009*, Report (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010), 29.

¹²⁰ *Internal Displacement Monitoring Center*, September 6, 2010, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/4FA1F522E7DAED3BC1257796003124EB/\\$file/Pakistan_Overview_Sept2010.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/4FA1F522E7DAED3BC1257796003124EB/$file/Pakistan_Overview_Sept2010.pdf) (accessed October 2, 2010), 1.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 3

¹²² Shaun Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," 3.

assumption of martial law over the next half-century slowly gave the ISI its political character. The real growth of ISI took place when the United States decided to expel the Soviets, using Afghan rebels. Of \$200 million annual aid, the ISI was able to siphon off substantial cash and small arms for its own, later strategic use.¹²³ With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the ISI became the lead agency in fomenting and coordinating the insurgency in Kashmir. These two major campaigns and the intervening military regimes have over a period of time skewed the basic character of the ISI and given it a larger-than-life role. The ISI has played the role of "king maker" in politics, protected military regimes, and coordinated insurgency in Kashmir, and has manipulated radical Islamic groups within Pakistan. The ISI is known to support Sunni Islamism, which is known to have caused wide spread ethnic strife within the state.¹²⁴ Gregory further explains:

[t]he role of ISI in subverting democracy and civil society in Pakistan, deny the people of Pakistan a legitimate outlet for their grievances, stifles the development of democracy and leaves much of the political space open to colonization by Islamists.¹²⁵

With such far-reaching roles, the ISI has become another power center within Pakistan, further contributing to the instability of the state. The ISI draws its strength from its role in Kashmir, which Pakistan considers to be the core issue that needs to be resolved. The continued role of the ISI in Kashmir is causing instability within Pakistan by interfering in domestic politics, and by not allowing democratic institutions to take root.

4. Suicide Terrorism

Pakistan today faces one of the highest rates of suicide bombings, which is a trend that has existed since 2002. Between 2003 and 2009, a total of 19,165

¹²³ Gregory, "The ISI and the War on Terrorism," 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 12.

people including civilians, security force personnel, and terrorists have been victims of this new form of attack.¹²⁶ Insurgents or terrorists would typically like to stay alive to see the fruits of their labor. However, a lack of success through conventional means or competitive pressure can lead to desperation and then to suicide attacks. Lanche believes that "suicide bombing comes during the second iteration of the conflict, after the insurgents have attempted more conventional means."¹²⁷ He goes on to explain that:

[s]uicide attack is a double-edged sword for a group in its quest for power, for it is simultaneously, a source of legitimacy and an incentive for others to surpass the group.¹²⁸

The Jihadi insurgents bred in the name of the LICs waged against India are now in a state of turmoil within Pakistan, trying to outdo each other, creating a civil war-like situation. Suicide attacks can also be seen from a religious perspective, as Pakistan raises the bulk of its Jihadi cadre in the name of religion. Religion can often provide a moral justification for the death and destruction that follows an attack and give Jihadists a sense of atonement.¹²⁹ While religion by itself does not cause violence, it can act as a catalyst to breed suicide terrorists. Pakistan's continued use of religion as one of the planks for waging LIC has caused it intense harm and has the potential to do more in the future.

¹²⁶ Jermie Lanche, *Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan: An Assessment*, Special Report (New Delhi: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2009), 1.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 6.

¹²⁹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), xi.

E. EFFECT ON PROSPERITY

1. Effect on Economy

Pakistan has suffered due to internal political chaos and also due to low levels of foreign trust in the country's stability. Domestic inflation jumped from 7.7 percent in 2007 to 20.8 percent in 2008, and again to 14.2 percent in 2009. The Pakistani rupee has depreciated since 2005 as a result of political and economic instability.¹³⁰ The rate of Pakistani rupees per U.S. dollar, slid from 59.51 in 2005 to 81.41 in 2009. Pakistan has often been rescued by U.S. economic bailout packages and also by not being labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism. Due to this U.S. policy, Pakistan has continued to receive reasonable amounts of FDI, and was hence able to maintain a positive growth rate of 2.7% in 2009. The involvement of Pakistan on its western borders with Afghanistan has also affected its economy and internal stability. "The Afghan Transit Trade established between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s had become the biggest smuggling racket in the world and had enmeshed the Taliban with Pakistani smugglers, transporters, drug barons, bureaucrats, politicians and police and army officers. Central Board of revenue estimated that Pakistan lost \$80 million in customs revenue in the financial year 1992 and the same rose to \$600 million in 1997, and this was in direct synchronization with Taliban expansion in Pakistan."¹³¹ In an International Monetary Fund working paper, Gupta states:

[a]n analysis of 22 conflict episodes shows that armed conflict is associated with lower growth and higher inflation, and has adverse effects on tax revenues and investment. It also lends to higher government spending on defense, but this tends to be at the expense of macroeconomic stability rather than at the cost of lower spending on education and health. Our econometric estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that conflict and terrorism have a significant negative impact on growth through changes in the

¹³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html> (accessed February 21, 2010).

¹³¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 189.

composition of government spending... Thus there is potential for a sizable “peace dividend” for countries that are able to resolve conflict and terrorism.¹³²

In a recent World Bank 2010 report on South Asia, analysts are of the opinion that countries affected by conflict have shown a marked decline in growth and trade, when compared to countries with no conflict; this is best explained in Figure 5.¹³³




Figure 5. Growth and Trade in Countries With and Without Conflict in South Asia

It is thus possible to see some co-relationship between the policy of LIC, its impact on domestic security environment, and its indirect impact on economy.

2. Effect on Development Expenditure

Pakistan has seen a downward trend in real GDP growth in the last few decades. Real GDP growth fell from over 6% per annum in the 1980s to around

¹³² Sanjeev Gupta, et al., *Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict And Terrorism In Low and Middle-Income Countries*, Working Paper (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002), 1.

¹³³ World Bank, *World Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010: Moving Up and Looking East*, 2010, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1269620455636/6907265-1275784425763/SAREconomicUpdate7June2010.pdf> (accessed November 14, 2010), 33.

4% during the late 1990s. This poor performance was due to a combination of high interest payments on public debt and the commensurate fall in development expenditures over the same period.¹³⁴ According to Pakistan's Finance Division Policy Wing, the country witnessed a gradual decline in its governance profile in the 1990s, which in turn impacted the government's ability to deliver essential goods and services to the poor. In addition, double-digit inflation and slowing industrial growth contributed to lower incomes and less employment. These macroeconomic imbalances resulted in reduced development expenditures and higher debt service payments. Domestic debt during the period 1990-1999 grew at an annual average rate of 16 percent, reaching almost 52 percent of GDP by 1999, up from 44.1 percent in 1990–1991. In other words, the domestic debt grew fourfold, rising from PRs 488 billion to PRs 1642 billion in one decade.¹³⁵ “During the period 1991–2001, boom and bust cycles of real GDP growth, precipitated by agricultural growth cycles, also had a significant impact in terms of increasing vulnerability, as per capita real GDP growth followed a declining trend” (see Figure 6).¹³⁶ The decline in the Pakistani economy in the 1900s, as discussed above, serves only to illustrate a possible link between the state of economy, the government's involvement in LIC, and the consequent deterioration of the internal situation in Pakistan.

¹³⁴ Finance Division Policy Wing, Pakistan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, November 2001, http://www.finance.gov.pk/poverty/iprsp_2.pdf (accessed August 28, 2010).

¹³⁵ Faisal Cheema, *Macroeconomic Stability of Pakistan: the Role of the IMF and World Bank*, Occasional Paper (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois, 2004), 7.

¹³⁶ Ibid.




Figure 6. Per Capita GDP Growth Rate of Pakistan

3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

The perception of a country being stable is vital for attracting reasonable FDI. "The behavior of foreign investors is always difficult to predict, as it depends on various factors such as wisdom, prior experience, perception and tolerance of economic and political risk, and long-term objectives."¹³⁷ Of the many factors influencing the flow of FDI, such as political stability, law and order, economic strength, government economic policies, government bureaucracy, local business environment, infrastructure, labor force, quality of life, and welcoming attitude, the first two factors are often deemed the most important.¹³⁸ Punjab and Sindh, two important poles of economic growth, have seen a high rate of disturbance since 1989, which has accordingly discouraged growth of businesses.

¹³⁷Arshad Ali, *Social Economic Cost of Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan*, Brief (Pakistan Security Research Unit, 2010), 9.

¹³⁸Ashfaque H. Khan, *Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: Policy Issues and Operational Implications*, Brief (Manila: Asia Development Bank, 1999), 13.

Along with the poor law and order situation, a lack of political stability has been an important factor in Pakistan. Between 1988 and 1996, three elected governments were dismissed on various charges, while four caretaker regimes lasted for approximately 90 days each. Such rapid changes in government along with changes in policies and programs cannot create a conducive environment for foreign investors. These rapid changes in the government were not mandated by the wishes of the population, but were mostly orchestrated by the military, the ISI, and a few radical Islamic parties. The fall or change of these democratically elected governments was most often to appease some of the radical political parties, which had an agenda to support the Taliban in Afghanistan and to initiate terror in Kashmir. According to the World Investment Report of 2005, Pakistan's inward FDI Performance Index ranking fell from 71 in 1990 to 117 in 2000, and in the same two corresponding years the FDI potential index fell from 92 to 130, and the outward FDI Performance Index rankings fell from 52 to 108.¹³⁹ The drastic drops in these performance indices are clearly an outcome of the evolving internal situation in Pakistan in the post-1990s period. It is also well documented that a rise in terrorist threats corresponds to a proportionate increase in transaction costs for doing business and trade. "A doubling of the number of terrorist incidents is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 6%. Moreover, additional security measures put in place to deter terrorist attacks can impede the flow of goods and services."¹⁴⁰

F. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL STATURE

1. International Stature

Today the globalized world looks for order and stability, as these are considered vital for economic activity to thrive in an unhindered manner. Any

¹³⁹ *World Investment Report 2005*, Country fact sheet (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2005).

¹⁴⁰ Sanjeev Gupta, et al, *Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict And Terrorism In Low and Middle-Income Countries*, 5.

incident or action of a country, which is contrary to these perceptions, is likely to adversely affect its reputation, and its acceptance as a responsible international player. As Cheema notes:

Pakistan's image in the international community has been damaged due to the rise of violent extremist and fundamentalist elements in the society. These elements have been involved in kidnapping and killing foreign nationals in the country, resulting in a deteriorating image of Pakistan worldwide. This has aggravated the decline of foreign investment in Pakistan.¹⁴¹

Bruce Riedel comments that Al Qaeda is said to have developed in the volatile mix of Afghani and Kashmiri terrorists in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden is said to have had a long and complex history with Pakistan and with the ISI.¹⁴² Pakistan relied heavily on him to operationalize the Afghan movement against Soviet occupation. The ISI also played a key role in establishing Bin Laden's ties with the Taliban when he returned to Afghanistan in 1996. According to the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004), the ISI was instrumental in setting up contacts between bin Laden and the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. Bin Laden and the ISI also worked together on the creation of Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), which was later to become the most violent and extreme of the Kashmiri organizations. Explaining this unholy nexus, Riedel notes:

[i]n late 1999, the connections between bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Kashmiris, the Taliban, and ISI were even more dramatically illustrated in the hijacking of an Indian airliner from Kathmandu in which one passenger was brutally murdered. The hijackers were assisted in gaining access to weapons in the airport by the local ISI station in Kathmandu. The hijackers sought the release of one of their leaders, Maulana Massoud Azhar, from a jail in India. The flight was diverted to Kandahar, where the Taliban protected the hijackers and negotiated with the Indian authorities. The ISI took

¹⁴¹ Faisal Cheema, *Macroeconomic Stability of Pakistan: the Role of the IMF and World Bank*, 35.

¹⁴² Bruce Riedel, "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm," 35.

Azhar on a victory tour around Pakistan after the ordeal was over to help raise funds for the Kashmiri cause.¹⁴³

While the world has taken note of Pakistan's complicity, it has often been overlooked because of its continued relevance to the United States in the global war on terror. It has accordingly not been branded as a state sponsor of terror in spite of it being fully eligible for the same.

2. Democracy at a Standstill

The preeminence of the Pakistani Army in the national calculus is a cause for concern for many people who believe in democracy. While Pakistan's army is strong, the state's dependence on its army for its cohesiveness is an area which needs further debate. The Pakistani Army views itself as the last bastion of competence, and regards all civilians with a great amount of disdain. Commenting on the Pakistani Army's attitude towards the civilian establishment, Cohen argues:

[t]his assessment applies to radical Islamists as much as to moderate Pakistanis. Nevertheless, the Army's disdain for civilians, both radicals and moderates alike, will not prevent the Army and its intelligence service from continuing to manipulate them for domestic and foreign policy purposes. Pakistan's history shows that the Army cannot run Pakistan effectively by itself but that the Army is also unwilling to entrust civilians completely with the job.¹⁴⁴

The international community will continue to look at Pakistan's democracy as an unfinished experiment. The other major casualty in the Pakistani situation is its judicial system. "While it never was strong or autonomous, the judicial system became corrupt and politicized under the alternating governments of Bhutto and Sharif."¹⁴⁵ Along with personalization of executive power, criminal prosecutions were politicized. In the name of fighting terrorism, there were gross

¹⁴³ Bruce Riedel, "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm," 36.

¹⁴⁴ Stephen P. Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," 19.

¹⁴⁵ Larry Jay Diamond, "Is Pakistan the [Reverse] Wave of the Future?," *Journal of Democracy*, 2000: 93.

violations of civil liberty, as summary military courts were established to try acts of political violence. As a result, some of the unintended consequences of breeding and exporting terrorism by Pakistan had begun to haunt it in ways that did not exist in its initial calculations.

3. Nuclear Brinkmanship

Pakistan's support of the LIC in Kashmir has often caused its security situation to spin out of control. Pakistan's desire to raise the stakes of LIC under the cover of its nuclear capability, along with India's desire to create space for conventional action below the nuclear threshold, has often caused great tension in the region and also within the international community. The classic examples are the Pakistani-sponsored attacks on the Indian parliament and in Kaluchak, and the subsequent Indian mobilization along the Pakistani border. It was only the international community's deft handling of the situation and the fear of a nuclear escalation that diffused the situation.¹⁴⁶ The Pakistani policy of LIC in the region is a destabilizing factor and puts Pakistan itself in an uncomfortable position.

G. EFFECT ON MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS

1. Education System

The radicalization of the education system has serious long-term implications for Pakistan. Despite U.S. pressure to control the *madrassas* and to turn students away from jihadist groups, their numbers have actually grown since 9/11. Many schools are said to openly encourage recruits to join jihadist organizations. Large numbers of schools breed sectarianism by harshly criticizing the Sufi and other more moderate Sunni interpretations of Islam.¹⁴⁷ The world

¹⁴⁶ Ian Talbot, "Pakistan in 2002: Democracy, Terrorism and Brinkmanship," *Asian Survey*, 2002: 199.

¹⁴⁷ Daniel Byman, *The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism*, Analysis Paper (Washington: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, 2008), 9.

needs to take note of these developments as this issue has long-term implications for the region and the world at large. Providing a truly liberal education to the next generation can be the single biggest gift Pakistan can give to itself. This will be one of the many long-term insurance policies that it must invest in, for national cohesion.

2. Military Values

Prolonged exposure to anything like politics, civil administration, or unconventional support for insurgency or terrorism can have a deep impact on core military values, or on the “professionalism” of the armed forces. No one knows this better than Pakistani Army itself, as this was an important lesson learned after the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Pakistan has a long history of military rule, with a large number of officers holding civil appointments, both during military regimes and in democratic administrations. These ad-hoc appointments invariably breed animosity among the general population, the civil administration, and the military. The ISI, which works under the control of the Army, is another organization which is most corrupted. The ISI also spearheads all support for the militant activities of the insurgents, and often has an agenda of its own. Under these circumstances it is not always clear who is in command and whose orders are being implemented¹⁴⁸. Especially disturbing is the radicalization of junior officers in the ISI, who could technically receive any orders from the top, but implement what they think is right. The control of ISI and its restructuring are vital for Pakistan’s democracy, and for peace to return in the subcontinent.

H. SUMMARY OF GAINS FROM LIC

1. Checkmate Indian Military Superiority

Pakistan, by virtue of adopting the strategy of LIC, has been able to bottle up a large number of Indian Army soldiers in the Kashmir Valley as they conduct

¹⁴⁸ Daniel Byman, “Rouge Operators,” *The National Interest*, no. 96 (2008): 52.

counterinsurgency operations. The term low-intensity conflict is actually a misnomer, because for the country conducting the LIC, the operations on the ground are demanding and fairly intensive.¹⁴⁹ Due to ongoing LIC operations, India continues to invest substantial resources in procuring military hardware that is specific to combating insurgency. These LIC-related procurements are often at the cost of other basic hardware that is required for defensive or offensive operations. Thus it is fair to say that LIC has tied down disproportionate numbers of Indian troops in the valley, thereby making them unavailable for operations in other sectors when the need arises.

2. Impose High Economic Costs on India

The continuous employment of the Army in protracted LIC operations within the country, in addition to being undesirable in a democracy, also imposes high costs in terms of men and material. When armed forces are used in an LIC over prolonged periods of time, their credibility often tends to go down.¹⁵⁰ India spends close to \$3 billion annually for maintenance of its forces in the Kashmir Valley.¹⁵¹ In addition, it spent close to \$300 million for construction of the security fence along its borders with Pakistan to seal off infiltration from across the borders.¹⁵² The high incidence of terrorist actions within the Kashmir Valley has scuttled or delayed large number of developmental activities, and those completed have mostly incurred cost overruns. The spread of LIC into the Indian hinterland can have long-term consequences on foreign investor confidence, which can have a direct impact on FDI.

¹⁴⁹ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," 234.

¹⁵⁰ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," 245.

¹⁵¹ Gautam Navlakha, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1171.

¹⁵² Ministry of Home Affairs, India, [http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_Fenc\(E\).pdf](http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_Fenc(E).pdf), (accessed May 14, 2010), 5.

3. Kashmir on International Agenda

Pakistan's continued aid to the LIC in Kashmir has ensured high rates of terrorist incidents in the Valley, which keeps the issue of Kashmir alive in the international media. Pakistan also uses these incidents to garner both moral and financial support from other like-minded countries. In addition, it is also able to keep the issue of Kashmir alive in international forums such as the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Another indirect benefit for Pakistan has been reduced foreign policy options for India in South Asia and the world at large.

4. Lead Actor Status in the Muslim World

Pakistan, by espousing the cause of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley, has been able to take a leadership position in the Muslim Umma. Commenting on the role of Islam, Nasr observed:

Islam increased Pakistan's regional power by opening new foreign policy possibilities before Islamabad, most notably in using jihadi activism to deal with developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir.¹⁵³

Continued unrest in the Kashmir Valley provided Pakistan with a platform to remain relevant, and from which to influence events in the state. Kashmir also acts as a rallying point for Pakistan to obtain financial support from other Muslim countries, to continue its fight for the so-called oppressed Muslim populations around the world.

¹⁵³ Vali Nasr, "The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry," 184.

I. MAIN LOSSES FROM LIC

1. Instability within Pakistan

a. *Radicalization of Society*

The desire of Pakistan to fuel the cycle of LIC in India has taken the country along the path of Islamic radicalization. The political elite and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, have consistently used religious fervor to gain and sustain support for militant activities, both within the state and across the borders. This, over a period of time has led to blowback effects within the country in the form of sectarian violence, and revolt against the established authority, as the State is not considered sufficiently Muslim. Any attempt to enforce order by the state often starts a cycle of violence, as most of the militant organizations have an agenda of their own, and are no longer under the control of those who created them.

b. *Alienation of Frontier Regions and Internal Displacement of People (IDP)*

The semblance of peace that existed in the NWFP of Pakistan three decades ago has been replaced by extreme violence and radical Islamic propaganda. Pakistan initially used the tribes of this region to wage a jihad against Soviet occupation, and later used them to fuel the insurgency in Kashmir. The country had to start fighting these very tribes in the post-9/11 scenario, as they began to target U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan and later target Pakistan's armed forces. The intense fighting in the region has led to large-scale IDP, causing social unrest, and the creation of a fresh breeding ground for a new generation of terrorists.

c. Possible Pay Back

External backing of an insurgency often creates a chain reaction, where one state's support for a guerrilla group can lead its adversary to provide assistance to the other countries' foes.¹⁵⁴ The positive aspect of payback is that it can put caution in the mind of the government as to the level of its involvement in the insurgency. Byman further explains

[m]any governments around the world that have restive minorities or other potential dissidents remained concerned that an aggressive policy abroad may lead the rivals to foment discontent at home. Iran, for example, was willing to forgo opportunities to extend its regional influence by supporting coreligionists in Central Asia and the Caucasus mostly out of fear that other states would do the same to Iran.¹⁵⁵

Pakistan, by sponsoring insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir, has created a possible vulnerability in its own backyard, in the trouble-torn regions of Baluchistan, Sindh, and the NWFP area.

2. Effect on Prosperity

a. State of Economy

Pakistan's involvement in LIC across the borders and its consequent impact on its own domestic situation is most evident on the economic front. Pakistan was only able to average a growth rate of 2.5 percent in GDP in the 1990s, after having achieved an average growth rate of over 6 percent in the 1980s.¹⁵⁶ This clearly coincides with Pakistan's involvement in LIC and reflects the period during which it backfired. Highlighting some of the intangible aspects of LIC and prolonged conflict, Gupta explains:

[o]ver and above the economic costs, prolonged armed conflicts can impose significant social and political costs that are difficult to estimate. For example, it is not possible to quantify the intangible costs of violence and insecurity, the human suffering and trauma,

¹⁵⁴ Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in outside Support For Insurgent Moments* , 34.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Faisal Cheema, Macroeconomic Stability of Pakistan, 38.

the breakdown in law and order, the animosity and mistrust that are created among warring parties, and the adverse effects of the reduced stock of health and education endowments on the long run growth prospect of a country.¹⁵⁷

b. State of Development

The decrease in real GDP growth rate in Pakistan can be attributed to a number of factors such as poor economic policies, bad governance, or, more importantly, a deteriorating law and order situation. Pakistan's domestic debt grew at an annual average rate of 16% during the period 1990-99, reaching almost 52% of GDP by 2000.¹⁵⁸ One of the main reasons for such high debts is increased military expenditure, which has increased in recent years due to the Pakistani Army's involvement in counterinsurgency operations. Presently a large portion of this is being subsidized by the United States as the targeted militants are seen as common enemies. The situation is likely to worsen once American interest wanes, and the funding stops for these efforts. Analyzing military expenditures, Gupta notes

[m]ilitary expenditures typically increase in response to conflict and terrorism, and tend to remain high even after cessation of violence. Higher spending for security can also affect the composition of public spending by decreasing outlays for education, health, and other productive items. Moreover, the destruction of physical infrastructure and human capital due to violence, and the indirect effects on trade, tourism and business confidence, all weaken the fiscal position and adversely affect economic growth.¹⁵⁹

Thus, Pakistan's involvement in first aiding LIC, and then combating the aftereffects of LIC in the form of counterinsurgency operations are now hurting Pakistan economically and the situation is likely to worsen with passage of time.

¹⁵⁷ Sanjeev Gupta, et al., *Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict And Terrorism In Low and Middle-Income Countries*, 4.

¹⁵⁸ Faisal Cheema, *Macroeconomic Stability of Pakistan*, 7.

¹⁵⁹ Sanjeev Gupta, et al., *Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict*, 5.

c. State of FDI

Pakistan has not been able to harness the full power of globalization, as a large number of multinational companies do not see it as a preferred investment destination, due to its internal security situation. Highlighting the situation in Pakistan, Cheema notes that:

[a]mong the major reasons for the poor position with regard to foreign investment is the generally negative perception of Pakistan in international business circles. Images of gun-toting, anti-Western Islamic fundamentalists, sectarian warfare and rumors of war with India are common enough. Nor does it help to know that there is an unaccountable military regime in office, while the judiciary appears incapable of delivering independent judgments in the event of clash of interests between the foreign or domestic investors on one hand and the government on the other. Finally, the significant exodus of indigenous capital and entrepreneurs to Canada, the United States, and elsewhere is hardly encouraging for potential foreign investors.¹⁶⁰

While the country has benefitted from its role as a partner of United States in GWOT, it has not been able to improve global investor confidence.

2. Effect on International Stature

a. *World View of Pakistan*

Pakistan's continued desire to prosecute an LIC against India has led to the establishment into an unholy nexus of the state with a large number of dubious non-state actors. In the pre-9/11 period this was largely seen as a South Asian problem, and was hence overlooked by the Western powers. Now with all major terrorist attacks around the world having been linked to Pakistan in one way or another, the pressure is on Pakistan to come clean and mend its ways.

¹⁶⁰ Faisal Cheema, Macroeconomic Stability of Pakistan, 10.

Byman calls Pakistan the most important omission in the list of state sponsors of terrorism, due to its long established support for terrorists fighting in Kashmir and of the Taliban fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan.¹⁶¹

b. Impact on Democracy

Pakistan's involvement in LIC, from the time of independence, has given the military a preeminent position of power and responsibility, both in domestic and international affairs. The Pakistani Army looks at civilian leadership with great disdain and contempt, for their inability to govern efficiently. The Army has consistently stepped in to take over the reins of the government whenever it has perceived that law and order is out of control. Pakistan's return to a true democracy will always be suspect, as long as the Pakistani Army exerts a disproportionate influence on government. The army's influence on government will remain as long as Pakistan uses LIC as an instrument of state strategy in its neighborhood.

c. Threat to Nuclear Facilities/ Weapons

Pakistan's association with LIC over prolonged periods of time has led to the increased "Talibanization" of the country. Domestic and foreign jihadist groups, along with the Taliban, have cross-fertilized with local Islamist groups in Pakistan to produce explosive ideologies, whose main agenda is violence and destruction.¹⁶² The instability created by these extremist groups has alarmed the international community about the safety of the nuclear stockpile held by Pakistan. The single biggest threat to the Western community from Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD), which would result from the availability of a nuclear device in the hands of any terrorist group. Among all nuclear capable countries,

¹⁶¹ Daniel L. Byman, "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," 1.

¹⁶² Byman, "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," 10.

Pakistan remains the weakest link in nuclear safety, and accordingly the world at large is worried about the situation. Discussing the issue of nuclear risks, Clary points out

Pakistan may have nuclear security measures as effective as any other nuclear power, but those nuclear weapons face greater risks than those in almost any other nuclear state... The true source of nuclear risk in Pakistan is the insecurity of Pakistan. Reducing that instability must be the focus of decision-makers in Islamabad, Washington, and Delhi.¹⁶³

J. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan today realizes the seriousness of the threat to its internal security, but there seems to be some ambiguity as to which of the existential threats are the most serious and need immediate attention. Most security experts consider sectarianism and the growing jihadi culture as the most serious of these threats. The impact of LIC on internal security or on democracy in Pakistan is still not in the open domain, and hence is not openly debated by the intelligentsia. This ostrich-like approach by Pakistan will neither help the country nor the world. Identification of the key issues that need immediate attention is fundamental to solving the problems in Pakistan.

1. Financing the Militants

Over the last two decades, Pakistan has been openly professing moral support for the insurgency in Kashmir.¹⁶⁴ In addition to providing moral support to Kashmiri insurgents, Pakistan also provides financial aid to a large number of insurgent organizations in Kashmir. Explaining the scope of terrorist financing, Chalk points out:

¹⁶³ Christopher Clary, "Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security In Peacetime, Crisis and War," *IDSA Occasional Papers* (Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis), September 2010: 34.

¹⁶⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, "U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 97.

[a]ccording to India's Research and Analysis Wing [RAW], annual ISI expenditure to the main militant organizations runs to between U.S. \$125 to \$250 million per year. These funds are used to cover salaries for fighters [which run from Rs.5000-Rs.10,000 a month], support for next of kin, cash incentives for high risk operations and retainers for guides, porters and informers. The ISI manages to fund the militant proxies through the circulation of counterfeit currency and by laundering profits derived from the heroin trade.¹⁶⁵

Financing of an LIC invariably leads the nation and its agencies to resort to non-traditional funding mechanisms, which by themselves can be destabilizing. Prolonged engagements in these activities can lead to the creation of independent power centers and splinter organizations, which often may have an agenda of their own.

2. Role of the ISI

Recurrent periods of military rule have given a larger-than-life image to the ISI. The use or abuse of the ISI has been a phenomenon since the time of General Zia Ul Haq, and over a period of time the organization has spread its tentacles into politics, electoral rigging, terrorism financing, and other non-intelligence activities. The ISI, which is under the firm control of the military, has always championed the cause of military rulers and helped them survive.¹⁶⁶ Commenting on the role of the ISI, Rizvi is of the view that “[t]heir role in state politics has undoubtedly borne all-around negative implications for the natural growth of political parties in Pakistan.”¹⁶⁷ This institutionalization of the role of the ISI in Pakistani domestic politics is a cause of concern for the future of democracy. It also puts a question mark on the ability of democratically-elected representatives to control the state intelligence agency, which is essential for civilian control of the armed forces.

¹⁶⁵ Peter Chalk, "Pakistan's Role in Kashmir Insurgency," 2.

¹⁶⁶ Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Political Parties and Fragmented Democracy," in *Pakistan: Reality, Denial, and Complexity of its State*, (Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2009), 78-79.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 79.

3. Pakistani Army

The army continues to exert a disproportionate influence over the government, especially on issues relating to foreign affairs and defense. The Army's preoccupation with issues relating to Kashmir and Afghanistan makes it vulnerable to manipulation by radical Islamist elements, as it depends on them for support in waging the jihad. Presently the Army is under intense pressure from the United States to weed out extremist elements on its borders with Afghanistan, as these continue to inflict casualties on U.S.-led forces. Adding fuel to fire have been the strikes on Taliban hideouts in Pakistan by United States helicopters and drones. The Pakistani Army's offensives action in the NWFP and U.S. drone strikes have been unpopular, and have been the cause of increased attacks on both Pakistani Army posts and United States supply convoys. The Army is balancing its approach in order to appease both the Americans and the Afghan Taliban, which is affecting its credibility.

4. Democracy

While democracy has been in place for the last three years, the Army continues to call the shots in Pakistan. Institutional mechanisms for democratic control of the armed forces such as a strong ministry of defense and budgetary controls on defense spending do not exist. The United States' continued dependence on the Pakistani Army for action on the ground in its GWOT is also not helping the cause of democracy. The strategic aims of Pakistan in Kashmir and Afghanistan appear to impede democratization, as it raises the importance of the army, which actively coordinates the LIC. As a consequence, the LIC in Kashmir is coming in the way of democracy in Pakistan.

K. CONCLUSION

The Pakistani Army is one of the few professional armies in the world to still rely on irregulars such as tribals or mujahedin for the conduct of regular war. In spite of repeated failures, it has not been able to comprehend the diminishing

returns and the long-term impacts on the professionalism of its army, due to the use of these non-state actors. Its experiences in 1947 and 1965 should have given the Pakistanis a sense of the “holding power” of these actors in a conventional conflict; these fighters invariably crack as an entity when under pressure. While the use of irregulars facilitates diplomatic deniability, it also attracts damaging international attention.¹⁶⁸ With the increasing availability of satellite monitoring and other electronic means, along with worldwide concern over non-state actors, the leverage available in the conduct of an LIC is definitely decreasing. The low returns from LIC when combined with the disturbing instability that it brings, should act as a disincentive for prospective players of LIC. Articulating his views on the difficulty of measuring the costs of terrorism, Gold explains

[t]errorist incidents impose large direct costs upon individuals and societies. The immediate costs can be measured in terms of the economic value of the lives lost and property destroyed in terrorist incidents. These measures are usually derived by estimating the present market value of the projected future production of the lost human and physical assets. This does not mean that all losses can be reduced to purely market calculations. The emotional toll imposed on victims, relatives, friends, other survivors and a broad range of community members is quite real, and while the legal system does try to measure these losses – pain and suffering, for example – there is an important sense in which the usual methods of quantifying costs are insufficient.¹⁶⁹

Pakistan is today under tremendous international pressure to come clean on its role in perpetuating terrorism. As the GWOT comes to a close, Pakistan will be asked more questions than it can answer. A recently released U.S. study alludes to the future of terrorism as, “For those terrorist groups active in 2025, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the

¹⁶⁸ R.S.N. Singh, "Use of Irregulars: Bane for the Pakistani Army," 7.

¹⁶⁹ David Gold, "Economics of Terrorism," *Columbia International Affairs Online: Case Studies*, 2003: 1.

world's most dangerous capabilities within their reach."¹⁷⁰ With these kinds of projected scenarios, it is best to identify the epicenters of terrorism now and find solutions for the future. The study of the Pakistan situation should help in understanding the long-term implications, and the pitfalls of using insurgency and terrorism as a state strategy. The solution may lie in Pakistan helping itself, with the rest of the world nudging it along.

¹⁷⁰ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Report (Washington: U.S. Government, 2008), 68.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The attitudes and policies of Pakistan towards itself, Afghanistan, and India, will decide the future course of events in the troubled regions of South Asia. The evolution and manifestations of these policies and attitudes can be greatly influenced by the policies and actions taken by the United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent in India. While Pakistan and the United States are likely to act in their own self-interest, it is important to identify a possible convergence of interests leading to a common end-state, which is acceptable to both.¹⁷¹ Positive developments in the region can emerge with the United States creating the right environment by incentivizing good behavior by Pakistan, and Pakistan accepting them as good enough reasons to change. This entire process of change can be further facilitated by responsible actions and policies on the part of India. This change in mindset by Pakistan must be driven by a clear realization that its policy of LIC is causing it more harm than good and that it needs to dismantle the physical infrastructure that is in place today, which continuously feeds the LIC. It also needs to take a second look at providing "just the moral support," as this kind of support without material support may not be acceptable to militant groups, and may cause more harm in the long run. An analysis of the net gains and losses from its strategy of supporting LIC should convince Pakistan to undertake an immediate re-appraisal of its policies.

¹⁷¹ Moeed W. Yusuf, "The U.S. - Pakistan Relationship and Finding an Endstate in Afghanistan," *CTC Sentinel*, September 2010: 10.

B. WAY AHEAD FOR PAKISTAN

1. Introduction

The proxy war, or LIC, in Kashmir has been a conscious strategy on the part of Pakistan from the time it gained independence in 1947. It was able to unleash the full power of LIC in the 1990s due to the opportunities presented by India in Kashmir. Pakistan saw it as a cost-effective strategy to bleed India, and accordingly adopted the strategy of LIC, and put in place an elaborate infrastructure to support these operations. The initial success spurred the nation into believing that it was the right way forward. The events of 9/11, Pakistan's reversal of its policy of supporting the Taliban, and effective control of insurgency by India in Kashmir, together created a situation in which the militants trained by Pakistan began seeing Pakistan itself as the wrongdoer and hence the target. Sartaj Aziz, a former foreign and finance minister of Pakistan, mentions that "[f]or every ten [militants] who are trained here to fight in Kashmir, one goes and the rest stay in Pakistan to cause trouble."¹⁷² While this shows the concern of Pakistani elite about the problems of its support for the radical mujahedeen, they have not been able to develop an alternate strategy. India, which considers Kashmir to be an integral part of the country, will not give up possession of the state under any circumstance. The solution to the vexed problem of Kashmir lies in the reconciliation of the situation by Pakistan. International pressure and the deteriorating internal situation in the country, as well as the realization that the gains from LIC are far less than the losses, should compel Pakistan to change course. Some key issues that need to be resolved as it changes its policy are discussed below.

¹⁷² Anatol Lieven, "The Pressures on Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs*, January 2002: 116.

2. Clarify its Stand on LIC

It is time for Pakistan to re-clarify its position on its support to militants operating from its soil. Musharraf, in a major policy speech on January 12, 2002, publicly declared

[t]o limit the influence of Islamic militants at home, including those previously described by him as "Kashmiri freedom fighters." "No organizations will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir," he declared, "Whoever is involved with such acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country."¹⁷³

The above commitment by the General was under substantial pressure from both the United States and India (due to the massive buildup of troops along its borders). Pakistan's commitment to delink itself from the Afghan Taliban, immediately after 9/11 was again under tremendous pressure from the United States. Musharraf said then, "violence and terrorism have been going on for years and we are weary and sick of this Kalashnikov culture ... The day of reckoning has come."¹⁷⁴ Pakistan needs to clarify its position to itself, and the international community, and be counted as a responsible player. The course that Pakistan adopts in future, would have direct impact on the well-being of Pakistan. In 1992, General Sood opined:

[t]he days of contradictory stance appear to be over, and Islamabad will have to choose between continuing as a terrorist state, sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir and shedding its cloak of innocence and respectability, or abjuring its violent part, for as Ayub Khan had once stated: "how long can we endanger Pakistan for the sake of Kashmir?"¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan's Terrorism Dilemma*, <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach14.pdf> (accessed November 03, 2010) 351.

¹⁷⁴ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan's Terrorism Dilemma*, (accessed November 03, 2010) 352.

¹⁷⁵ V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," 240.

3. Clarify its Stand on Role of Religion

While Pakistan was born out of a need for a separate land for Muslims, it was still very much secular in character. Most leaders, from Jinnah to Musharraf, have fundamentally laid faith in a secular system. Some leaders did change course, both due to political pressures and the desire to stay in power. General Zia radicalized the religious institutions in order to wage LIC and since then radical Islamist groups have gained in strength and become more politically active. Highlighting the dilemma of religion in Pakistan, Davis observes:

[a] second trend encouraged by the radicalization of religious parties has been of more recent providence and far less violent but may prove in the long run more significant. This is the growing tension in society between Islamists and secularists in which 'government' is taking a decidedly ambivalent position.¹⁷⁶

The demands for Islamization in Pakistan can be countered by strengthening civil society and by encouraging growth of secular political parties. On the other hand, whenever political parties or the regimes seek the support of Islamists to garner political legitimacy or to achieve strategic objectives, it is the Islamists who win.

4. Belief in Democracy

Pakistan was born a democracy, but the spirit of democracy was soon lost to a maze of factors that included domestic political turmoil, obsession with Kashmir, and the gradual change from a secular state to an Islamic state. Pakistan's close relationship with the United States did not help in its transformation into a truly democratic state, as it was a "marriage of convenience." Initially Pakistan was required to contain China, and then to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan, and more recently to bring stability in Afghanistan. Explaining the American attitude to Pakistan, Cohen states,

¹⁷⁶ Anthony Davis, "Pakistan: State of Unrest," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1999: 36.

[t]he American agenda was clear: a pro-western Pakistan, a stable Pakistan, a prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic Pakistan were all desirable, but not in that order.¹⁷⁷

Pakistan's transition to a true democracy would have to be driven by its genuine desire for peace in the region. This desire will reduce the power and influence of the military, and as a consequence Pakistan will need to abstain from its present policy of using LIC as a state strategy. This will automatically reduce the role of both the Army and the radical Islamist elements, and will allow democratic institutions to take root and flourish.

5. Build Capacity and Willingness to Fight Terror

Once Pakistan decides to change course in its strategy of LIC, it will have to dismantle the infrastructure that has been in place for years. Dismantling the physical infrastructure, such as training camps or launch pads would be easy, but the difficult part would be in handling the human component. People trained to wage LIC would have to be de-radicalized and then rehabilitated so as to do mainstream work. Simultaneously, there would be a need to professionalize organizations like the ISI, and wean it away from domestic politics. This would be a long and difficult task, and may require certain amount of international help. Alluding to the lack of capacity within Pakistan to fight terrorism, Hussein observes

[o]ne of the biggest problems for the Pakistani state is the absence of an organized and dedicated infrastructure to combat, contain and crush terrorism in a sophisticated and scientific manner. Pakistan is now building this infrastructure with United States assistance, while the government will also have to reorder priorities for the intelligence agencies, shifting their focus away from domestic political intelligence towards counterterrorism."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 56.

¹⁷⁸M. Hussein, "Asia-the Genesis of Pakistan's Terrorist Problem," *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 2002: 4.

While the Pakistani Army is designed for conventional war against India, it is the Frontier Corps (FC), which is responsible for counterinsurgency operations, but it is poorly trained, and is often sympathetic to some of the insurgent groups. The police have little or no capacity to handle the internal situation, as the population has no trust in them.¹⁷⁹ Correcting these anomalies is one of the challenges before Pakistan in the short- to medium-term periods.

6. Conclusion

It is time for Pakistan to realize that its policy in Kashmir is not paying back, and that its hope of "bleeding India into concessions - a strategy that has to date failed to change India's negotiating position or to weaken India's resolve,"¹⁸⁰ is a non-starter. The gap in conventional military capabilities between India and Pakistan continues to widen. According to a recent RAND Corporation study, India spent five times more than Pakistan on defense in 2006.¹⁸¹ Vested interests within Pakistan continue to block any alternate options to resolve the issues with India. A state of confrontation with India on the Kashmir issue is in the interest of the military, and to a certain extent the political elites. This deadlock can only be resolved by either a popular mass action, or by external pressure.

C. FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE USA

The United States has multiple objectives to keep Pakistan engaged, with the most important being the partnership to fight the war on terror in Afghanistan. It also requires continued intelligence inputs from the Pakistani ISI on Al Qaeda activities, within and outside Pakistan. It also expects Pakistan to deny its territory for all radical Islamist groups, who wish to train and mount attacks on

¹⁷⁹ Christine Fair, *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State*, 137.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 110.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 137.

United States assets all over the world.¹⁸² Under these circumstances, getting Pakistan right is an enormous challenge for the United States. "In the past, short term gains always have had priority for the United States over long term concerns, when it comes to Pakistan. Today, ignoring the long term could have grave consequences."¹⁸³ The United States must find a way of halting the production of Jihadi militants from Pakistan. The U.S. may have to link its aid to actual reforms on the ground. Pakistan will remain central to the war on terrorism and to that extent the U.S. will have to engage any regime that is in power and support a transition to a relatively stable self-sustaining state. Explaining American foreign policy, Riedel observes:

[f]or the last sixty years American policy toward Pakistan has oscillated wildly between periods when Washington was entranced by Islamabad and embraced its policies without question (Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan and Bush 43), or sanctioned Pakistan and blamed it for either provoking wars or developing nuclear weapons (Johnson, Carter, Bush 41 and Clinton). In the love-affair years, Washington would build secret relationships (the U-2 base in Peshawar and the mujahideen war in the 1980s) and throw literally billions of dollars at Pakistan with little or no accountability. In the scorned years, Pakistan would be démarched to death and Washington would cut off all military and economic aid. Both approaches failed dismally.¹⁸⁴

It is now time for the Americans to develop a coherent policy for Pakistan, which will look at the long-term interests of both Pakistan and the United States.

1. Re-examination of State Sponsors of Terror

Experts are of the opinion that the existing approach towards identifying state sponsors of terror is flawed and often biased.¹⁸⁵ The current list of state

¹⁸² Fair, *Pakistan*, 139.

¹⁸³ Stephen Cohen, "America and Pakistan: Is the worst Case Avoidable?," *Current History*, 2005 March: 139.

¹⁸⁴ Bruce Riedel, "Armageddon in Pakistan," *The National Interest*, June 2009: 5.

¹⁸⁵ Daniel L. Byman, "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," 1.

sponsors of terror according to the U.S. Department of State is in Table 1.¹⁸⁶ One glaring omission is Pakistan, which has long aided terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is also a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. In addition, countries like Venezuela and Yemen are part of the problem, as they deliberately look the other way when their citizens support terrorist groups.¹⁸⁷ Some of these countries can be more dangerous than the countries listed in Table 1, as they have Islamic jihadi links. Addressing this issue, Byman states:

[t]he United States should consider creating a list of passive sponsors and activities in an attempt to “name and shame” them into better behavior, using as a model the “transparency index” that measures the level of corruption in countries around the world.¹⁸⁸

Country	Designation Date
Cuba	March 1, 1982
Iran	January 19, 1984
Sudan	August 12, 1993
Syria	December 29, 1979

Table 1. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism: U.S. Department Of State

As America continues to take help from Pakistan in its GWOT, it will need to calibrate its response on the issue of naming Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, as it has the potential to backfire in either of the options. In case it attempts to brand Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror, it may spell the end of present cooperation; in the case that the status-quo is maintained, the United States must be prepared for prolonged operations in Afghanistan. Any action taken by the United States must pose a visible threat, or threat in being, for Pakistan to change its attitude.

¹⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State, *State Sponsors of Terrorism*, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm> (accessed October 31, 2010).

¹⁸⁷ Daniel L. Byman, " The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," 1.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

2. Anti-Americanism

Among the many countries that profess anti-American feelings, Pakistan takes the lead due to a combination of historical and present day reasons. Pakistan also accuses America for many wrongs that are happening within the country, in spite of the large amount of aid being received from the United States. Kizilbash identifies three main reasons for the anti-American feelings in Pakistan:

[o]ne involves U.S. policies towards Pakistan such as failure to come to Pakistan's aid during the Bangladesh crisis, using Pakistan for its own interests, and its position to Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program. A second deals with American global policy, including support of Israel, opposition to Iran's present government, and the use of force against small Third World nations. The third includes American involvement in Pakistan - for example, support of the Military regime, obstructing the settlement of the Afghani issue, and responsibility for the decline in the value of the local currency.¹⁸⁹

It is important for America to identify the root causes of this deep-rooted acrimony and find a way out, as this has an indirect effect on homegrown terrorism within United States.¹⁹⁰

3. Bolster Counter Terror Capacity

The United States can help Pakistan build up the required capacity to fight domestic terrorism, in terms of technology, training, and tactics. Byman observes, "capacity without will is meaningless."¹⁹¹ Willingness to fight domestic terror and terror outside its borders, can be induced by causing embarrassment and also by attaching a stigma to Pakistan's actions.¹⁹² The amount of pressure

¹⁸⁹ Hamid H. Kazilbash, "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1988: 58.

¹⁹⁰ Khuram Iqbal, "Anti-Americanism and Radicalization: A Case Study of Pakistan," *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, 2010: 4.

¹⁹¹ Daniel L. Byman, "Passive Sponsorship of Terrorism," *MIT Security Studies Seminar*, October 2004: 4.

¹⁹² Ibid.

that needs to be applied invariably requires due calibration, as any undue pressure could undermine the very existence of the civilian government.

4. Help Democratize Pakistan

The United States must slowly move away from its dependence on Pakistan Army for achievement of its strategic goals in the region. The close relationship between the US and the Pakistan Army is seen with great concern by the civilian elites, who see this alliance coming in the way of development of democracy.¹⁹³ For long term stability in the region and for democracy to take roots, United States must reduce its engagement with Pakistan defense forces. This disengagement may be difficult at this stage when it is dependent on Pakistan Army for tactical intelligence and logistic support, but it is essential for long term peace in the region.

5. Help Safeguard Nuclear Assets

Pakistan is known to have been involved in the diffusion of nuclear technology, through the AQ Khan network.¹⁹⁴ The United States must help Pakistan implement suitable measures to safeguard its nuclear arsenal and prevent any illicit proliferation. In the backdrop of current militant activity in the region, it is also important to physically secure the nuclear warheads, and towards this end the United States may provide help in the form of the provision of technology for access doors, vaults, surveillance gear and other instruments for material accounting.¹⁹⁵

6. Repackaging of Aid

The large amount of aid being provided by the United States must facilitate in the transformation of Pakistan into a responsible democratic nation.

¹⁹³ Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 304.

¹⁹⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 107.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

America's continued need for Pakistan in terms of logistics, intelligence, airspace and some Pakistani boots on ground, would put conflicting demands on its policy makers.¹⁹⁶ The United States will have to put in place long-term plans for development of Pakistan, and commit itself to fulfilling them, and convince the Pakistani's of their resolve to do it. Any such commitment by United States will further stretch its already strained economy. The challenge for United States lies in calibrating the quantum of aid provided to a corresponding visible change in attitude of Pakistan.

7. Help Improve Relations between India and Pakistan

A stable South Asia is in the long-term interest of the United States, as it helps reduce the risk of another Indo-Pakistani war, and also facilitate in the maintenance of balance of power in the region.¹⁹⁷ The primary area of divergence between the U.S. and Pakistan, is Pakistan's policies towards Kashmir and its relation with India. While the United States would like to see Pakistan using only peaceful means to resolve the Kashmir issue, Pakistan is intent on using LIC as a tool to achieve its aim. Pakistan's continued use of LIC in Kashmir is not only destabilizing Pakistan from within, it is also affecting the war on terror by the U.S. in Afghanistan, as militants seamlessly operate on both sides of Pakistan's borders. The United States can help convince Pakistan that resolving Kashmir issue is in its long-term interest, and that it must not expect a plebiscite or any substantial changes in existing borders in Kashmir. In return, the United States could offer Pakistan peaceful nuclear cooperation, provide Islamabad a missile defense and provide other conventional military hardware.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Chistine Fair, Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State, 137.

¹⁹⁷ Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 112.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 113.

8. Conclusion

In dealing with Pakistan, United States must avoid temptations for short-term gains, and must seriously look at consolidating the political structure of Pakistan. While engaging the military is a necessity in the short term, to get assistance in the war on terror, Washington will have to focus on restoring democracy in the true sense.¹⁹⁹ LIC being waged by Pakistan must be viewed in a holistic manner, as it has the capacity to affect the course of events both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. All the components involved in waging LIC, i.e. the Jihadists, the ISI, the Army and even the political leadership will have to be addressed to tackle this menace. Alluding to this, Cohen argues

American policymakers must look beyond al Qaeda to troubling developments within Pakistan and consider the possibility that Pakistan, an ally, might become a major threat to a number of American interests.²⁰⁰

Getting Pakistan right is no easy task, as the United States will have to balance competing interests and take into account the effects of its policies in the short and the long run.²⁰¹ "Pakistan will continue to be an expanding source of long term security threat"²⁰², unless the U.S. initiates measures to wean it away from its desire to achieve strategic gains through the use of LIC.

D. OPTIONS FOR INDIA

India has been on the receiving end of the adverse consequences of LIC and international terrorism, long before the world's recognition of terrorism as a truly global menace. Post-independence, Pakistan made a number of attempts to undermine Indian governance in Kashmir, by fueling insurgency with the provision of men and material from across the border. Until now, India has

¹⁹⁹ Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 114.

²⁰⁰ Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 306.

²⁰¹ Ibid.,

²⁰² Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 114.

managed to contain the situation through a combination of police and military action along with delivery of better governance. Pakistan's actions have certainly impeded India's progress, but India has shown marked resilience in not escalating the situation. Pakistan was particularly emboldened to raise the ante in the 1990s due to its acquisition of a nuclear capability. Pakistan deduced that its nuclear capability provided a shield from conventional reprisal by India, while India always tried to create some space for it. The Kargil war of 1999, clarified three aspects one, the limitations of what can be achieved by so-called non-state actors; two, there exists some space between nuclear and conventional wars under certain circumstances; three, the tolerance of international players for cross-border transgressions is limited. India, along with the United States, is an important player, and what India does directly impacts Pakistan's actions and its options thereof.

1. **Govern Kashmir Better**

Providing quality governance will be the single biggest step in solving the vexed problem of Kashmir. Better governance provides space for maneuver to the Indian government in the international arena and in turn denies space for international interference.²⁰³ India has identified the problem in Kashmir as a socio-economic-political problem, which requires comprehensive solution. It will need to integrate the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with the rest of India and also replicate the pan India economic success in this hill state. A pre-requisite for investment in the state, is a better security situation, and having achieved that the administration must invest in the strengths of Kashmir to include tourism, handicrafts and hospitality sectors. Once there is a semblance of stability, India could consider giving the state limited autonomy within the provisions of the

²⁰³ A. Vinod Kumar, *Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions: Analysing the India-Pakistan Theatre*, May 8, 2009, http://www.idsa.in/events/lowintensityconflictundernuclearconditions_avkumar_080509 (accessed November 5, 2010), 1.

Indian constitution, to further ameliorate the feelings of the population. Jammu and Kashmir presently enjoys certain amount of autonomy under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

2. Isolate the Problem to Kashmir

India must contain the insurgency to the Kashmir valley, and not allow its spread to the rest of the state, and definitely not to rest of the country. This will require focused efforts in the Jammu and Ladakh regions of Jammu & Kashmir state, and other insurgency affected areas of India. India must address the Maoist problems and the separatist tendencies of North- East India through effective Centre-State coordination. Any laxity on this front would automatically provide larger playing field to Pakistan, and provide further incentives for LIC.

3. Leverage Indian Muslim Population

India, which is home to over 150 million Muslims, constituting 13.4% of the Indian population, is truly a multi-ethnic country living in peace, albeit with occasional flare-ups. India has a large Muslim community, which is next only to Indonesia and Pakistan. Commenting on the status of Muslims in India, Puri explains:

[h]aving been exposed to the two great civilizations of the world, Indian and western, they are, intellectually and culturally, the most richly endowed Muslim community of the world. Nowhere else did Islam confront as ancient a civilization, as speculative and pluralistic philosophical thought, and as non-combative but resilient a faith as in India. Similarly, no other Muslim community has had as long and direct an exposure to the rationalism, modern knowledge and institutions of the west.²⁰⁴

The plurality of India, in terms of its religions, languages, customs and traditions, is the strength of India and Kashmir is no exception. The large strength of liberal Muslims in India could be mobilized to showcase the peaceful co-

²⁰⁴ Balraj Puri, "Indian Muslims since Partition," *Economic and Political Weekly* 28, no. 40 (1993): 2149.

existence of Hindus and Muslims across India for over half a century. Muslim intelligentsia could highlight the freedom and opportunities that Muslims enjoy in India, when compared to many other parts of the world. This will effectively neutralize Pakistani propaganda of the state of Muslims in India and more specifically the opportunities for the Muslims of Kashmir. Under these circumstances India sees legitimacy in its control of Kashmir, and not allow its separation merely on the grounds that it has majority Muslim population.

4. Upgrade India's Counterinsurgency Capability

India has been home to insurgencies almost since independence, and has been fighting the same in the North and Eastern part of India. The Maoist insurgency, spread across the length of India, is the next big challenge for India. India will have to invest in upgrading its skills in combating LIC, as it needs to contain the extremist elements in Kashmir and prevent the spread of Maoist culture to other parts of India. While India can claim to be experts in this business, it lacks technological finesse to fight without collateral damage. This up gradation in technology and tactics will not only prevent Pakistan from gaining an upper hand in Kashmir, but will also discourage them from further fueling insurgency.

5. Is "Tit for Tat" an Option?

When a country launches an LIC against another country, it is the fear of "pay-back" that normally puts caution into the minds of the host nation. In the case of Pakistan, there seems to be some realization of this possibility, but it is intent on exploiting the contents of "Gujral Doctrine," which defines India's relations with her neighbors. The Gujral doctrine was viewed as marking a serious policy change in India's relations with its smaller neighbors. Explaining some of its key policy aspects, Sundaralingam notes that

[i]ts central theme was to reassure its neighbors that India did not have expansionist or ulterior motives, and it is set out through five basic principles. First, India would not ask reciprocity, but gives and

accommodates what it can in good faith and trust; second, no South Asian country should allow its territory be used against the interests of another; third, no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another; fourth, all should respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other, and finally, should settle all disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.²⁰⁵

Up to the present, India has resisted abetting separatist movements within Pakistan, as it is a zero-sum game. This policy is also in tune with Indian desire to be seen as a responsible international player. India will accordingly have to explore other options to stop Pakistan from supporting LIC. While many may call this policy timid and passive, it is likely to pay off in the long run.

6. Mobilize International Support

India should mobilize international support to compel Pakistan to change its strategy of using LIC, as a means to wrest Kashmir from India. The international pressure should stem from the knowledge that LIC breeds insurgents and terrorists, who are not only a threat to India but also to the rest of the world. Many may attribute the non-use of military power by India, to contain LIC by Pakistan, even under extreme provocation, as political timidity²⁰⁶. India's low-key response is mostly in tune with its long held position of restraint and avoidance of escalation. This contrast in policies must itself make the international community to take action against Pakistan, and bring it back to acceptable standards of behavior. United States and China will have key roles in moderating the behavior of Pakistan towards itself, and its immediate neighbors, as the economy and security of Pakistan is closely linked with these two countries.

²⁰⁵ Ravi Sundaralingam, *South Asia Analysis Group*, (accessed October 9, 2010).

²⁰⁶ A. Vinod Kumar, *Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions*: (accessed November 5, 2010), 2.

E. CONCLUSION

Pakistan began its support to LIC, as a conscious strategy to attain its objective of getting Kashmir back from India, right from the time of its independence. In the last two decades it raised the stakes, by increasing the level of support to both the Kashmiri separatists, and to its own cadres fighting across the borders. India took the better part of 1990s to contain the situation in Kashmir by effective counter insurgency operations and better governance. In the period post "9/11", Pakistan was compelled into supporting the United States in its global war on terror. Pakistan was forced into fighting the very same Taliban cadres it had trained, and was also under pressure to stop its actions in Kashmir. A combination of some of these events, created a situation in which the militants saw Pakistan as the enemy within, and began targeting the state apparatus.

Pakistan's continued support to the United States and the United States unabated drone strikes in Pakistan territory have further complicated matters for both the military and the political elite. In the ensuing confusion, the radical Islamic militants groups began causing havoc within Pakistan by targeting the military and the minorities. Sectarian violence reached new proportions with Shias and Sunnis targeting each other's mosques with a vengeance. Radical Islamist groups are exploiting this uneasy situation, and are gaining in strength at the cost of democratically elected government. Pakistan today is in a state of turmoil, largely because of the choices it made, and the decisions it took in the last two decades. There is a partial realization that some of its policies are not paying off, but any change in course is considered suicidal by both the politicians and the military.²⁰⁷ Under these circumstances, the driver for change must emerge from within Pakistan. With the key stakeholders, i.e. the politicians and the military not ready to rock the boat, it will have to be the general population, which has to revolt and demand for change. Any change of this nature, can only

²⁰⁷ Christine Fair and et al., *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State*, 201.

be accomplished by complete overhaul of the existing system. But, any situation like this is likely to bring the military back into power, in the name of restoring a hopeless situation. Herein lies the dilemma for Pakistan.

The emergence of a true democracy in Pakistan is the only way out of the mess that it is in. Thereafter, if Pakistan proceeds on the path of normal political and economic development, there would be lesser need for using LIC and Islam for political and strategic goals. This path obviously entails giving up the cause of Kashmir, and the only incentive for this change would have to be avoidance of "self-destruction" of Pakistan. After all the survival of Pakistan is more important than the acquisition of Kashmir.²⁰⁸

Pakistan, in spite of being a State Sponsor of Terrorism has been able to remain afloat due to diplomatic support and economic aid of the United States. As soon as this lifeline is removed, pressures from within and outside Pakistan will start affecting the future of this Islamic nuclear country. It is important for both United States and India, to help Pakistan become a moderate and forward-looking state. This will automatically lower the tensions in South Asia and reduce the threat of terrorism worldwide. Pakistan will have to begin first by dismantling its infrastructure of LIC and refocus its energy on its own development. It is ultimately in the interest of Pakistan to help itself, to come out of the mess that it is in, while the rest of the world can nudge it along.

208 VK Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability, 240.

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